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Abstract
This paper uses a lab-in-the-field experiment in Malawi to document two new facts
about how parents share resources with their children over time. First, for almost a
third of study participants, the further in the future consumption is, the more generous
are parents’ plans to share it with their children. Second, many participants revise
those plans as consumption gets closer, reallocating from children towards themselves –
even when consumption is still in the future. None of these patterns can be accounted
for by present-bias. Instead, both are consistent with a relevant share of parents
discounting their future utility of consumption to a greater extent than that of their
children. We document that parents characterized by such asymmetric geometric
discounting display sizable preference reversals every period, a phenomenon we denote
parent-bias. We find that, despite ambitious plans, those parents actually allocate
less to their children in the present than other parents, and that such preferences
predict under-investment in children outside the lab just as much as quasi-hyperbolic
discounting. Commitment devices designed for present-bias do not mitigate parent-
bias. Our findings provide a new explanation for under-investment in children and
inform the design of new interventions to address it.
Keywords: Time preferences; Preference reversals; Children’s human capital
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“The task of anthropologists, and of economists also, is to collect anecdotes that may or may not lend
themselves to testable conjecturing. In actual economic life, and in the writings of economists, the phe-
nomena of how people treat the present and the future (and the past, too) offer a rich treasure trove of
varied behaviors.” – Samuelson (2008, p. 1)
1 Introduction
In the film The Boy Who Harnessed the Wind, a brilliant Malawian boy is barred from
attending school after his parents fail to pay his school fees despite repeated promises.
The lead character builds a windmill that helps his town escape famine, and eventually
becomes an engineer. While his fate is exceptional, the starting point of the movie is all
too common. Parents, all over the world, frequently fail to follow through on ambitious
plans to invest in their children’s health and education.1
While liquidity is likely to severely constrain those investments among the poor, in-
terventions designed to relieve poverty often have only small effects on investments in
children.2 Instead, quasi-hyperbolic discounting is a leading explanation for gaps between
past intentions and present actions. Time inconsistencies, typically in favor of instant
gratification (present-bias), come to rationalize broken promises in general, and under-
investment in children in particular. Having said that, present-bias does not fully account
for deviations from geometric discounting in the way parents plan investments in children,
or in the way the latter more often than not renege on those plans. To that effect, when the
Malawian father in the movie realizes the family does not have as many resources as initially
expected, he does not decrease spending equally across household members: adjustments
to the family budget hurt investments in children disproportionately. Present-bias cannot
rationalize that asymmetry.3 In this paper, we document that such asymmetric reversals
emerge as part of systematic patterns in how parents share resources with their children
over time. We then introduce a new type of time preferences that can rationalize those
patterns. We find such preferences to be as correlated with real investments in children’s
human capital as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and uncorrelated with present-bias.
To document how parents plan to (and effectively do) share resources with their chil-
dren in the future, and how those plans evolve over time, we conduct a lab-in-the-field
experiment with 1,627 parents in Malawi. Measuring parents’ time preferences is challeng-
1According to the 2018 World Development Report, while primary enrollment has increased substan-
tially worldwide since 1970, secondary enrollment is still only 40% across Sub-Saharan Africa (p. 59), with
huge differences between urban and rural areas (p. 62).
2Glennerster & Kremer (2012) and Kremer & Holla (2009) document that demand for educational
and health investments in children falls very steeply as soon as prices are above zero (even if very low).
Microcredit does not systematically increase investments in children Banerjee (2013). While conditional
cash transfers and earmarked loans increase those investments, there is evidence that such effects might
be driven by other mechanisms – from salience to present-bias (Glennerster & Kremer, 2012).
3Present-bias predicts only a general tendency to cut down on investment plans when their costs become
immediate, not a tendency to cut down differentially across investment plans for parents and children.
While asymmetric present-bias could explain this, we discuss in detail below how the phenomena we
document are distinct from it.
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ing, as it requires observing how they plan to share consumption within the household over
time, and whether they actually stick to those plans. We follow the literature in moving
away from using decisions about monetary payments to make inferences on time prefer-
ences; instead, we draw upon real consumption decisions that can be perfectly observed
at the time of the experiment.4 We study parents’ decisions concerning a non-fungible,
tempting and nutritious good – peanuts –, documenting their plans to split consumption
with their children over different time horizons. The experiment takes place during the
lean season in Malawi; as such, we can have subjects undertake payoff-relevant decisions
in this setting at a reasonably low cost. Enumerators visit the parents three times. During
the first visit (round 1), parents choose how they want to share the peanuts with one of
their children by the time enumerators revisit them two days later (round 2) and four
weeks later (round 3). There is no consumption at round 1. At round 2, parents have
the opportunity to set new consumption plans (potentially different from their round 1
decision), allocating consumption in the present and in little less than four weeks. There
is no decision at round 3; only consumption. Every allocation set by parents can be drawn
to be implemented with positive probability, and peanuts are consumed in front of the
enumerators – precluding side transfers. Such design features several advantages. Peanuts
shut down concerns with fungibility and arbitrage outside the lab. Moreover, different
from the typical experiment to elicit time preferences, our design does not allow subjects
to transfer resources over time. This feature allows us to easily capture how parents trade
off their own and their children’s consumption within period, and how those trade-offs vary
with the time gap between plans and consumption. Last, allowing parents to revise their
former decision enables us to document preference reversals.
We start by documenting two new facts about how a relevant fraction of parents allocate
resources over time. The first is that many parents’ planned budget shares allocated to
children tend to increase with the time gap between plans and actual consumption. At
round 2, almost one third of parents allocate a higher share of the total budget to their
children in the future – nearly 46% higher than what they get allocated in the present. The
second is that many parents revise their plans away from children’s future allocation when
the decision gets closer to actual consumption (even if still 28 days away). Such preference
reversals are almost 1/3 as common as present-bias in our sample, and are quantitatively
large: for those parents, the round-3 budget share allocated to children decreases by 37%
on average.5
We implement many design choices to rule out that such patterns could be rationalized
4As money is fungible, the timing of the payments and of the consumption acquired with it are not
necessarily connected (Augenblick & Rabin, 2019). In addition, subjects may have arbitrage opportunities
and their choices over monetary payments could simply reflect the interest rates they could access outside
of the lab (Augenblick et al., 2015; Cubitt & Read, 2007). What is more, since parents control how money
is spent outside the lab, decisions about how to split money between themselves and their children would
be non-committal in the context of our experiment. Examples of real consumption in the time-preferences
literature include real effort tasks (Augenblick et al., 2015; Augenblick & Rabin, 2019; Barton, 2015),
irritating noises (Solnick & Waller, 1980) and squirts of juice (Brown & Camerer, 2009; McClure et al.,
2007).
5They are also consequential: parents have no further opportunity to revise their plans at round 3.
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under standard time preferences. First, we can rule out learning about preferences between
decision rounds: parents taste some peanuts before each round to minimize the risk of
projection bias (Loewenstein et al., 2003) and children do not consume peanuts before the
end of round 2. Second, rounds 1 and 2 are only two days apart, minimizing concerns
with other shocks that could affect parents’ information set when they can revise their
plans. Comparing parents’ responses to different interest rates at rounds 1 and 2, we can
also rule out directly that parents’ (expected) marginal utility of consumption at round 2
has changed between rounds.6,7 We also document that parents do not strategically adjust
their child’s consumption outside of the experiment between visits.8
Most importantly, none of those facts can be accounted for by present-bias. Without
shocks to the expected marginal utility of consumption between rounds, present-bias pre-
dicts that children’s budget shares should be constant over time, and that plans should only
be revised once they have immediate consequences. Instead, those stylized facts are consis-
tent with asymmetric geometric discounting (AGD). For concreteness, consider a mother
who discounts her children’s future consumption to a lesser extent than her own. Those
time preferences are a deviation from geometric discounting; she thinks that her future self
will (or wishes she would) be more generous towards her children than her present self,
which in turn leads to systematic preference reversals: every period, she reallocates bud-
get shares, away from her children’s planned consumption and towards her own. For this
reason, we call reversals generated by AGD preferences parent-bias. Under-investment in
children (relative to her original plans) arises as a direct implication of being relatively less
patient about her own future consumption. While preference reversals have been shown
to be a necessity when multiple decision-makers with different discount rates allocate a
single payoff stream for the group (Jackson & Yariv, 2015), parent-bias follows from a
single decision-maker – a unitary parent – with multiple discount rates deciding on how
to allocate a single payoff stream across multiple group members – herself and her child.
Parent-bias has important implications for the following reasons. First, because AGD
preferences are likely to be prevalent; after all, time inconsistencies often arise as a con-
flict between deliberation and affect (Loewenstein, 2018), and children bring about sharp
tensions between the two: parents often aspire to provide a better future for their chil-
dren, but are pressed against present needs. Second, because commitment devices that
address present-bias, such as lock-boxes or illiquid accounts, do not mitigate parent-bias:
preventing within-household reallocation requires commitment devices that are specifically
designed to limit decision-makers ability to change past plans differentially across house-
hold members.
Using only round-1 decisions, we document that about 30% of subjects exhibit asym-
metric geometric discounting, allocating higher budget shares to their child in later rounds.
For those subjects, the average share allocated to their children increases from 43% two
6See Appendix G.4




days later to nearly 65% thirty days later. Allocating a larger share of consumption to
the child in later time periods is not necessarily irrational: parents may, for instance,
expect their child to have a higher marginal utility of consumption than their own, or a
higher probability of survival further in the future. However, such time preferences strongly
predict reversals. In just two days, AGD parents reallocate their children’s round-3 con-
sumption share towards their own roughly five times as often as other parents, by almost
20% of the mean consumption share they had previously planned to allocate to children
in the future. Strikingly, despite ambitious plans, AGD subjects end up allocating less to
their children in the present (about 4% less than other parents, a statistically significant
difference).
Could asymmetric preference reversals be driven instead by asymmetric quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, whereby subjects display present-bias only (or to a greater extent) towards
their own consumption?9 The answer is no: present-bias – even if it affected parents’ and
children’s future consumption to different extents – cannot generate preference reversals
when plans are still in the future. Our experiment can capture (asymmetric) present-bias:
we have parents also allocate peanuts for their own consumption over time, defining as
present-biased those who revise their round-3 consumption plans downwards when we re-
visit them two days later. We find that present-bias and parent-bias are indeed different
phenomena linked to how parents treat the present and the future (in the words of the
opening quote by Samuelson): the latter is not systematically correlated with the former.
Moreover, we can also reject that AGD parents are systematically less present-biased about
their children’s future consumption than about their own.10
We also rule out several other potential confounders for preference reversals by par-
ents who, at round 1, plan to allocate time-increasing budget shares to their children.
Specifically, we show that reversals are not an artifact of (1) indifference between different
allocations driven by indivisibilities in how peanuts could be split between parents and
children; (2) changes across rounds in the salience of fairness with respect to how parents
allocate resources across the child participating in the experiment and their other children;
(3) measurement error in the extent to which choices reflect preferences; (4) communi-
cation between parents of different types between decision rounds; or (5) correlation of
AGD preferences with other preference features, such as the strength of their preference
for peanuts.
While our experiment is based on consumption allocation trade-offs within periods (as
parents cannot transfer resources across periods), most investments in children actually also
involve trading off resources across periods. In fact, education or preventive health care
are prototypical examples of investments in children’s human capital with upfront costs.
Do AGD preferences generate under-investment when such trade-offs are present? Using a
simple model, we show that, in the investment case, even parents sophisticated about their
9Koelle & Wozny (2018) provide evidence that agents are less likely to exhibit present-bias when making
decisions on behalf of others.
10If anything, the opposite is true; see Appendix G.4.2.
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own bias are prone to preference reversals, and that naive AGD parents massively under-
invest relative to otherwise identical symmetric parents.11,12 Calibrating the model with
parameter estimates based on allocation decisions in the experiment, we show that AGD
parents’ under-investments in their children lead to large welfare losses: for investments
with a 1-year horizon until returns pay out, naive parents’ long-term utility is equivalent to
that of symmetric parents with 24.5% lower income. Sophistication only partially mitigates
welfare losses (18% lower income-equivalent long-term utility).
We also provide evidence that AGD preferences predict investments in children outside
the lab to the same extent as present-bias. We survey parents at the end of round 3 about
recent investments in the education and health of the child involved in the experiment. The
correlation between AGD preferences and actual investments in children is nearly identi-
cal to that between the latter and quasi-hyperbolic discounting, holding fixed the extent
to which parents discount their children’s future utility of consumption. Among parents
near the high-end of the patience distribution, AGD preferences (just as present-biased
preferences) predict under-investments in children relative to otherwise identical parents;
for instance, for parents with a daily discount factor of 0.996, being AGD decreases invest-
ments in 6-12 year-old children by approximately a third of the effect of being downgraded
from primary school to having no education.
What policy instruments could potentially mitigate the reallocation effects of asym-
metric geometric discounting? We start by evaluating a light touch intervention, inspired
by evidence that mental accounting helps increase investments in other settings (Thaler,
1999): does labeling planned budget shares as children’s consumption at least partly miti-
gate parent-bias? To study this question, we randomly assign a sub-sample of participants
to a framing intervention: at the beginning of round 2, the starting point of subjects’ al-
location decision is their round-1 allocation. As such, each parent’s previous allocation to
children’s consumption is made salient at the time they have the opportunity to revise it.
The intervention, however, has no effects: we find that AGD parents assigned to labeling
reallocate away from their children’s planned consumption just as much.
Next, we turn to commitment devices. Demand for commitment designed to address
present-bias is often low, even among sophisticated subjects (Ashraf et al., 2006; Augenblick
et al., 2015; Kaur et al., 2015; Laibson, 2015).13 Is that also the case for parent-bias?
We offer subjects the possibility of committing to their allocation plans set at round 1,
varying the price of commitment experimentally. Participants are offered a probabilistic
commitment device, in the spirit of Augenblick et al. (2015), which decreases the likelihood
11All our comparative statics between AGD and symmetric parents hold fixed the discount factor that
applies to children’s future utility of consumption.
12In our experiment, less than 1/3 of parents are sophisticated about parent-bias. Interestingly, we
show that sophistication is not a unidimensional feature across biases: only a small share of subjects are
sophisticated about both present-bias and parent-bias, while a larger share is sophisticated about one but
not about the other.
13Exceptions are Ariely & Wertenbroch (2002); Beshears et al. (2020); Casaburi & Willis (2018);
Schilbach (2019).
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that the allocation set at round 2 is implemented instead of that set at round 1.14 We find
no clear pattern linking AGD preferences to demand for commitment in the lab. Strikingly,
outside the lab, we find that AGD parents are actually less likely to commit to future plans.
In a 6-month follow-up, we enter all parents into a lottery, and offer them the opportunity
to commit lottery proceeds to tutoring for their child in case they win. We find that AGD
parents display a 23% lower willingness to pay for commitment than other parents.
Incidentally, this follow-up experiment allows us to document that the implications of
AGD preferences are confined to one’s children, different from time-increasing altruism
towards others more generally. We do so by eliciting parents’ willingness to commit lottery
proceeds to tutoring someone else’s child. While all parents are systematically less likely
to allocate lottery proceeds to tutoring another child, AGD parents are not differentially
likely to do so.
Our study contributes to an active literature about behavioral biases linked to invest-
ments in children’s human capital. Present-bias can explain under-investment in children,
as naive parents systematically over-estimate the extent to which they will trade off costly
investments and later returns in the future.15 Preference reversals associated with present-
bias have been extensively studied (Augenblick et al., 2015; DellaVigna & Malmendier,
2006), particularly within Development Economics (Ashraf et al., 2006; Gine et al., 2016;
Tarozzi & Mahajan, 2011). In contrast, parent-bias has been overlooked, even though we
find it to be as predictive of real investments in children’s human capital as present-bias
in our sample.
This paper also relates to a growing literature that studies systematic deviations from
geometric discounting in richer ways than a sharp discontinuity between the present and
all future periods.16 In particular, while several papers investigate whether subjects tend
to be more generous towards others in the future than in the present, our study is the first
to elicit asymmetries in discount rates for parents’ and their children’s future consumption,
and to document the consequences of such asymmetries for within-household allocation.17
A few papers have posited that discount rates differ across consumption goods (Ubfal,
2016), which could lead to poverty traps (Mullainathan & Shafir, 2013).18 We extend
14This design ensures that both decisions can bind with positive probability and allows us to observe
decisions by all subjects in both time periods.
15The theoretical link between present-bias and investments in children is noted in Glennerster & Kremer
(2012), but there is limited empirical evidence documenting that link. One notable exception is Ringdal
& Sjursen (2017) which shows that increasing the bargaining power of the most patient parent increases
investments in children.
16See, for instance, theory and evidence that feelings of anticipation can generate rich patterns for future
plans and dynamic inconsistencies (e.g. Caplin & Leahy, 2001; Thakral & To, 2020).
17In the absence of trade-offs between one’s own and other’s consumption, subjects tend to be paternalist,
aligning choices for others with their own preferences, (Ambuehl et al., 2019; Krawczyk & Wozny, 2017;
Uhl, 2011) or to display more patience for others than for themselves (Shapiro, 2010). When there are
trade-offs, subjects tend to display time-inconsistent generosity (Koelle & Wozny, 2018). There is related
evidence that generosity might interact not only with time preferences, but also with risk preferences
(Exley, 2015) and preferences over fairness (Andreoni et al., 2018).
18There is a also a literature on different discount rates between different decision-makers within the
household and its consequences for time inconsistencies (e.g. Jackson & Yariv, 2015). More generally, for
the consequences of intra-household bargaining, see Chiappori (1988) and Baland & Ziparo (2017).
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those consumption models to also account for investments in children, and estimate the
welfare implications of sub-optimal investments.
Last, our findings inform a range of new policy instruments that could address parent-
bias and, potentially, increase investments in children – from school meals to illiquid sav-
ings accounts earmarked to children. At the same time, our results on low demand for
commitment outside the lab suggest that it might be challenging to prevent parents from
reallocating away from planned investments in children even if those instruments were in
place.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
of investments in children, highlighting the implications of asymmetric geometric discount-
ing for parents’ dynamic allocation patterns. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy
for testing the model’s predictions. Section 4 then documents the two new stylized facts
about how parents plan and effectively split resources with their children over time, fol-
lowed by rigorous tests of model’s predictions using our experimental data in Section 5,
including analyses of AGD preferences’ correlation with real-life investments in children
and a calibration of its welfare consequences. Section 6 tests whether framing interven-
tions can mitigate parent-bias, and elicits AGD parents’ demand for commitment. Section
7 concludes the paper.
2 A model of parental investments in children
In this section, we present a simple model of parental allocation decisions between them-
selves and their children over time, characterizing the predictions for within-household
allocation trajectories in the presence of asymmetric geometric discounting (AGD). Sub-
section 2.1 starts with the consumption case, which abstracts from inter-temporal trade-offs
and sophistication about preference reversals. Next, we consider the investment case in
subsection 2.2.
2.1 The consumption case
We depart from a simple three-period model of investments in children. Each household
consists of one child and one parent. In each period t ∈ {1, 2}, the parent decides how
to allocate income (y, constant over time, for simplicity) between her own consumption
(xt) and that of her child (zt) at t ∈ {2, 3}. To focus on the dynamics of future plans, we
abstract from consumption at t = 1; the parent only sets future allocations at this period,
deciding on how to split consumption between herself and her child at t = 2 and t = 3.
S/he revisits those two decisions at t = 2. At t = 3, consumption decisions can no longer
be changed: the parent and her child consume according to the choice made at t = 2. We
assume there is no uncertainty and no technology to smooth consumption over time (we
relax the latter in the next subsection).
The parent derives instantaneous utility from consumption u(xt), and the child, v(zt),
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both increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable. The parent weights her
child’s instantaneous utility by an imperfect altruism parameter, α ≥ 0. S/he discounts
her child’s future consumption one period ahead by δ ∈ [0, 1], and her own consumption
one period ahead by θδ, with θ ∈ [0, 1].19 While we abstract from present-bias in this
simple formulation, Appendix G.4.2 augments the model by allowing for quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, with potentially different β’s applying to the parent’s and the child’s future
utility of consumption.








s.t.x12 + z12 ≤ yx13 + z13 ≤ y,
where superscripts indicate that the decision is made at t = 1.










s.t.x22 + z22 ≤ yx23 + z23 ≤ y,








. At t = 2,
they become : u
′(x22)
v′(z22)




If the parent discounts her consumption and that of her child to the same extent, i.e.
if θ = 1, then FOCs are identical in both periods, and the share of consumption allocated
to the child is constant over time.20 In other words, the parent will not deviate from plans
made at t = 1 when revisiting the decision at t = 2.
Conversely, if the parent discounts her own future consumption to a greater extent
than that of her child, i.e. if θ < 1, then s/he will plan to allocate a larger share of
consumption to her child further in the future, an immediate implication of decreasing
marginal utility of consumption.21 Moreover, this will lead to preference reversals at t = 2:
an AGD parent will deviate from her t = 1 plans when given the chance to update her
19While this formulation is related to Ubfal (2016), which estimates heterogeneous discount rates across
different goods, and to Banerjee & Mullainathan (2010), in which temptation goods are differentially
discounted in the future, in our model, differences in discount rates can arise across consumption of
different subjects, with consequential implications for parental decisions on behalf of the child. Moreover,
our model gives rise to new insights, in particular when it comes to issues of sophistication and commitment
to future plans (see Section 2.2) and welfare implications (see Section 5.6).
20Let skj be the budget share allocated on t = k to child’s consumption at t = j. Formally: s12 = s13 =
s22 = s
2
3 for consistent parents.
21Formally: s13 > s12 and s23 > s22 for AGD parents.
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Figure 1: Budget shares allocated to the child in each period at each decision round
(a) Symmetric parents (θ = 1) (b) AGD parents (θ < 1)
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) plot the budget share allocated to the child in each period at each decision
round. In each panel, the first two bars refer to the decision made at t = 1, and the last two bars, to the
decision made at t = 2. Within each decision round, the white bar represents children’s consumption share
at t = 2 and the black bar, that at t = 3. All figures assume that the parent’s and the child’s instantaneous
utility of consumption is logarithmic, that parent’s coefficient of imperfect altruism, α, is equal to 0.9 and
that θ = 0.7.
decision at t = 2, reallocating consumption away from her child, towards herself.22 Those
predictions are indistinguishable from an alternative formulation in which the coefficient
of imperfect altruism is time-increasing, with αjk < α
j
k+1. Empirically, we consider the
distinction between parent-bias and time-increasing altruism (not specific to one’s children)
in subsection 6.3.4.
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in (planned) allocations between symmetric and
asymmetric geometric discounters who face otherwise identical utility functions with a
numerical example. The left-hand-side panel showcases the decisions of the former: they
allocate the same budget share to their children to be consumed at t = 2 and t = 3,
irrespective of when that decision is made. The right-hand-side panel highlights that, in
contrast, when AGD parents make allocation decisions in the first time period (the first
two bars), they plan to be more generous towards their child in the later consumption
period relative to when revising their decision in the second time period (the last two
bars). Allowing parents to be present-biased does not change Figure 1 as long as the same
β applies for both the parent’s and the child’s future utility of consumption; Appendix
G.4.2 discusses how that changes when we allow β’s to be different.
Proposition 1 generalizes the model’s predictions in the presence of AGD preferences.
Proposition 1: AGD parents (1) allocate budget shares to their children increasing in the
time gap between the decision and consumption, and (2) reallocate away from their children
planned consumption (towards their own) at every period.
22Formally: s12 > s22 and s13 > s23 for AGD parents.
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Proof: Generalizing the model’s FOCs to decisions made at t = j about consumption at







Due to decreasing marginal utility of consumption, if θ < 1, then the child’s budget share
increases in k − j (part 1) and decreases in j (part 2). 
2.2 The investment case
In this section, we allow for inter-temporal transfers to study if the insights of the consump-
tion model still hold in the presence of dynamic trade-offs, especially among sophisticated
parents. In this model, AGD parents are still subject to preference reversals when it comes
revising their child’s planned consumption; we investigate whether anticipating realloca-
tion leads sophisticated AGD parents to compensate by over-investing in children in the
present, relative to symmetric parents.
To keep the analysis simple, we restrict attention to a two-period model, allowing
parents to revise consumption decisions but not investment decisions over time. At t = 1,
the parent chooses how much out of income y to consume, how much to allocate to her
child’s consumption at t = 1, and how much to invest in her child, I. Investment yields
gross return R = 1 + r at t = 2. As in the consumption case, the parent makes plans of
how to split income y +RI between herself and her child in t = 2. In sum, investments in
children can be used as a savings vehicle to smooth consumption over time.23










s.t.x11 + z11 + I ≤ yx12 + z12 ≤ y +RI
An important additional element of the investment model is the parent’s belief about
her future utility function. We define θ̂ as the parent’s belief at t = 1 about the value
that θ takes at t = 2. More precisely, following O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999), the agent
thinks that her t = 2 utility function is: θ̂u(x2)+αv(z2), with θ̂ ∈ [θ, 1]. The sophisticated
type anticipates correctly that her t = 2 utility function entails θ̂ = 1. The naive type
incorrectly believes that her t = 2 utility function entails θ̂ ∈ [θ, 1), (fully naive if θ̂ = θ).
Assuming a specific functional form for the parent’s and the child’s instantaneous util-
ity function (CRRA) to obtain tractable results for comparative statics, Proposition 2
23Although extremely simple, the model can accommodate more complex elements; for instance, if
parents can recover only a fraction of investments in children, that can be expressed as a lower interest
rate.
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establishes that AGD parents under-invest relative to symmetric discounters.
Proposition 2: AGD parents of all types choose a lower level of investment than a sym-
metric geometric discounter with otherwise identical preferences. If the coefficient of con-
stant relative risk aversion is larger than 1, then investments in children by AGD parents
increase with their degree of sophistication.
Proof: See Appendix D.1. 
The second part of the proposition holds as long as the coefficient of constant relative
risk aversion is larger than 1 (Holden & Quiggin, 2017 finds an average CRRA coefficient
of 1.73 for Malawi). In that case, sophisticated AGD parents increase investments in
anticipation of future reallocations away from children’s planned consumption (although
never as much as to completely mitigate the effects of AGD preferences on investments in
children).
Figure A.1 showcases a numerical example of optimal investment levels for the two
extreme types – a naive agent (with θ̂ = θ) and a sophisticated agent (with θ̂ = 1). It
makes it clear that, the lower θ̂, the larger the gap in investments between naive and
sophisticated agents.
[Figure A.1]
The results in this section also make it clear that instruments designed to mitigate
present-bias (such as illiquid savings) only imperfectly address parent-bias: while sophisti-
cated AGD parents could use investments in children as a way to mitigate the consequences
of within-household reallocation by ensuring a larger resource pool in the future, that does
not preclude deviations away from children’s planned consumption (as the ratio of marginal
utilities in each decision period remain the same as in Section 2.1).
In contrast, Proposition 3 establishes that if investments in children paid out directly
as future consumption rather than non-earmarked resources – which, in practice, could be
achieved with instruments such as school meal plans –, AGD parents would have (weakly)
lesser scope for reallocation (strictly if a corner solution is reached at t = 2).
Proposition 3: Commitment devices that pre-set future allocations to the child weakly
increase her future consumption relative to commitment devices with identical gross returns
that merely ensure a larger resource pool in the future.
Proof: Denote as {z∗t , x∗t }t=1,2, I∗ the solution to the parent’s problem when investment
pays out in cash in period t = 2. Now, let us modify the parents’ utility maximization












x11 + z11 + I ≤ yx12 + z12 ≤ y
In the modified problem, investment I pays out directly as child’s consumption in t = 2,
under the same gross interest rate R = 1 + r. Denote the solution to this new problem
{ẑt, x̂t}t=1,2, Î.
















This result comes to show that parent-bias requires specific commitment devices to
decrease the scope for within-household reallocation in the future – as commitment against
present-bias is typically designed in line with equation 4 rather than equation 5.
3 Empirical strategy
This section describes the design of our experiments, data collection and estimation. Sub-
section 3.1 discusses how we elicit parents’ planned budget allocations between themselves
and their child over different horizons, and how we document preference reversals, followed
by a discussion of identification concerns and the design choices we implement to address
them in subsection 3.2. Next, subsection 3.3 introduces how we evaluate interventions with
the potential to mitigate parent-bias. Subsection 3.4 then introduces how we elicit real-life
investments in children and demand for commitment outside the lab.
All details of the experimental design and a pre-analysis plan were pre-registered at
the AEA RCT Registry on November 06, 2018 (AEARCTR-0003535).24 An additional
pre-analysis plan was registered before the follow-up wave.25 Our baseline experiment
was conducted between November 2018 and January 2019, and the follow-up experiment,
between June and September 2019. Both experiments followed the same sample of house-
holds.
3.1 Documenting AGD and parent-bias
We design a lab-in-the-field experiment whose structure closely matches that of the con-
sumption model (Section 2.1). We visit participants three times: at round 1 (t = 1 in
the model), round 2 (two days later; t = 2) and round 3 (a month later; t = 3). At
round 1, respondents are asked to make consumption plans for rounds 2 and 3 (Section
24Pre-analysis plan available in full at https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3535. See
Appendix C.3 for a detailed discussion about deviations from pre-registration.
25https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4386.
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3.3 discusses how we offer some participants the opportunity to commit to those plans).
At round 2, they make those consumption decisions again (Section 3.3 discusses how we
frame that second decision relative to round-1 allocation in different ways). At the end of
round 2, one allocation (that set at rounds 1 or 2) is randomly chosen to be implemented;
this ensures that both decisions are consequential. Following Augenblick et al. (2015), in
the absence of commitment, the round-2 decision is implemented with 90% probability. At
round 3, respondents do not make consumption plans; they only consume according to the
allocation drawn at round 2.
Our sample consists of 1,627 households across 80 villages in Malawi’s Salima district.
Households were eligible to be enrolled in the study if both parents lived at home, if they
had at least one child aged between 3 and 12 years old, and if no one in the household was
allergic to peanuts. If participating households had multiple children in that age range, we
randomly selected one to participate in the experiment.
We use peanuts as the experimental currency that participants allocate between them-
selves and their children over time. Peanuts are a familiar and tempting good, consumed
and enjoyed by both parents and children in Malawi: 88% of adults and 97% of children
in our sample report enjoying the peanuts we distributed. This experimental currency is
payoff-relevant since Malawi is a poor country and our experiments take place during the
lean season.
Participants are asked to split the consumption of five packages of peanuts between
themselves and their child to be consumed at rounds 2 and 3. Round-1 allocations are set
by splitting five tokens between two plates labelled “My child in two days” and “Myself in
two days”, and five tokens between two plates labeled “My child in a month” and “Myself in
a month”. Round-2 allocations are set by splitting five tokens between two plates labelled
“My child today” and “Myself today”, and five tokens between two plates labeled “My child
in 28 days” and “Myself in 28 days”. At each round, respondents can only choose integer
allocations. Each parent makes decisions by herself, in the absence of children.26
This simple experimental design allows us to capture AGD preferences and to test
the main predictions of the model. First, comparing round-1 allocations set for rounds
2 and 3 allows us to define AGD parents according to the model’s prediction of time-
increasing budget shares allocated to children. Second, comparing round-2 allocations for
rounds 2 and 3 allows us to test the model’s prediction that AGD parents allocate time-
increasing budget shares to their children (to a greater extent than consistent parents).
Third, comparing round-1 and round-2 allocation decisions for round 3 allows us to test the
model’s prediction that AGD parents display preference reversals for future consumption,
reallocating away from their children’s planned consumption as the time gap between
decisions and actual consumption decreases (to a greater extent than consistent parents).
The comparison to consistent parents remarked in parentheses in the previous para-
graph is needed because our definition of AGD preferences entails measurement error :
26Appendix G.8 discusses results for a different sample of parents who made decisions in the presence of
their children.
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there are other (rational) reasons for why parents might set time-increasing budget shares
allocated to children at round 1. As such, the experiment allows us to document statisti-
cal relationships between the distribution of AGD preferences and those of the behaviors
associated with those preferences as predicted by theory. We discuss measurement error
in detail in Section 3.2.7.
3.1.1 Definitions
To fix ideas, this subsection rigorously defines how we capture AGD preferences and parent-
bias in the data. We define a participant as asymmetric geometric discounter based solely
on their round-1 decision: if s/he allocates a larger budget share to her child to be consumed
at round 3 than at round 2. Formally, let skj,i be the share of peanuts allocated to the child’s
consumption at t = j by parent i when the choice is made at t = k. Asymmetric geometric
discounting is then defined as: 1{θ̂i < 1} ⇔ s12,i < s13,i. We define a participant as
symmetric (or consistent) if s/he allocates constant budget shares to her child in rounds 1
and 2.27
In turn, we define parent-bias based on whether a participant changes decisions between
rounds: if s/he decreases the budget share allocated to their child’s round-3 consumption
when deciding at round 2 relative to when deciding at round 1. Formally, let skj,i be the
share of peanuts allocated to the child’s consumption at t = j by parent i when the choice




Our sample comprises mostly women: only 8.9% of participants are men, as fathers were
often away from home working elsewhere during daytime. About 15% of households in our
sample are Muslim, the rest identify as Christians. On average, participating households
have 2.2 children between 3 and 12 years old. The average age of children taking part in
our experiment is 7 years old, with equal participation from boys and girls. Respondents
in our sample are poor: on average, respondents state that they would be able to mobilize
around three dollars within a week in case of an emergency.
Sample size varies across different specifications of our analyses for the following rea-
sons. First, because we restrict attention to the control group of the framing experiment
(see Section 3.3) whenever testing the model’s predictions or implications of AGD prefer-
ences in the baseline data. As such, whenever we use the follow-up wave (such as when
estimating the correlation between AGD preferences and demand for commitment outside
the lab), the sample size is larger because there was no framing experiment in that wave.
Second, because of small attrition between decision rounds at the baseline experiment,
and between baseline and follow-up.28 Last, when estimating whether AGD preferences
27For completeness, we define a participant as ‘child-biased’ if s/he allocates a lower budget share to
their child to be consumed at round 3 than at round 2.
28Appendix G.2 documents attrition and shows that it does not vary systematically with treatment
assignment across the different experiments.
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are predictive of investments in children, we condition on the values of patience parameter
δ̂i calibrated from participants’ allocations, which also affects sample size as the calibration
algorithm failed to converge for a small number of observations (see Appendix E).
3.2 Identification concerns and design choices
We implement a series of design choices to ensure that our experiment captures time
preferences as intended, and to rule out alternative explanations for the stylized facts that
we document. We describe those identification concerns and the design choices to address
them over the next subsections.
3.2.1 Fungibility
Eliciting time preferences through lab experiments is hard: when experimental currencies
are fungible, subjects’ behavior may reflect arbitrage opportunities and interest rates they
can access outside the lab rather than their true time preferences (Augenblick et al., 2015;
Cubitt & Read, 2007). What is more, decisions about how to split fungible experimental
currencies between themselves and their children would be non-committal in the context
of our experiment, as parents could always adjust spending outside the lab to compensate
for decisions made within it.
To deal with that concern, we use peanuts as our experimental currency. Enumerators
observe the consumption of peanuts and their children immediately at rounds 2 and 3.
This ensures that consumption plans are implemented in conformity to decisions within
the experiment. Enumerators gently require that each participant consumes all peanuts
in front of them and ask a series of questions about peanuts to the participants as they
consume them.29 We did not experience non-compliance issues.
Having said that, it could still be the case that parents adjust their children’s (planned)
consumption outside the lab in between decision rounds. To rule that out, we survey
parents about consumption assigned to children outside of the experiment at each round,
and can rule out that parents adjust their children’s outside consumption in anticipation
of the decisions made in the experiment (see Section 5.4).
3.2.2 Projection bias
Projection bias (Loewenstein et al., 2003) reflects the fact that subjects do not realize that
current consumption affects future utility. That could lead to preference reversals regardless
of deviations from geometric discounting, e.g. because parents realize that themselves
(their children) like peanuts less (more) at the time than they had anticipated, after having
consumed those in an earlier round.
29This research was approved by the University of Zurich’s Economics Department Institutional Review
Board and Malawi’s National Committee on Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities. Participants
consent to participation according to those terms before the experiment, and can opt out of it at any point
in time.
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To deal with that concern, no consumption decisions are implemented at round 1, ruling
out that any changes between rounds reflect previous consumption patterns. Moreover, to
mitigate projection bias, participants taste a small number of peanuts before each round,
and are told that the rest of the experiment will focus on this type of peanuts. Last, we
survey parents about their level of hunger and their consumption of peanuts at each round,
and can control for those in our empirical analysis.
3.2.3 Experimenter demand bias
Testing whether AGD preferences are predictive of allocating time-increasing budget shares
to children also at round 2 could potentially confound participants’ desire to be consistent
across decisions rounds, rather than deep preference parameters.
To deal with that concern, we assign a different enumerator to every participant at
round 2, when they were asked to make new decisions. Incidentally, consistency pressures
do not seem to be systematic in our sample, as framing round-2 decisions based on round-1
allocations (as a starting point for the round-2 allocation decision; see Section 6.2) has no
significant effects.
3.2.4 Shocks to the (expected) marginal utility of consumption
Reversing plans over time does not necessarily implies bias. Subjects could rationally
change their planned allocations between decision rounds because of shocks that change
the ratio of their (expected) marginal utility of consumption relative to that of their children
at rounds 2 and/or 3.
To minimize that concern, round 2 was scheduled to take place only two days after
round 1, limiting the possibility of unexpected shocks to parents’ and children’s marginal
utilities. What is more, as far as possible, the second visit took place at the same time
as the first one. We also survey parents about liquidity constraints and hunger at every
round, and can control for those in our empirical analysis.
3.2.5 Asymmetric present-bias
AGD preferences generate predictions that cannot be rationalized by present-bias, as dis-
cussed in Section 2.1. In particular, the preference reversals that we denote parent-bias
(with respect to consumption plans that are still in the future) would not be observed even
among parents who display present-bias to a lesser extent (or not at all) when it comes to
decisions about the future consumption of their children.
Nevertheless, we still document quasi-hyperbolic time preferences in our sample to
study the joint distribution of present-bias and parent-bias. To do that, we have partici-
pants make decisions across two scenarios, presented in random order. One scenario was
that described in Section 3.1, whereby respondents make decisions on how to split peanuts
between themselves and their children over time. The alternative scenario had participants
allocated consumption over time just for themselves – a standard inter-temporal decision
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problem, under three interest rates. Participants had to split the consumption of three
packages of peanuts for their own consumption between t = 2 and t = 3. For each package
not consumed at t = 2, they received r additional packages at t = 3; r ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5}.30
Participants are told that every decision they made could be implemented by the enumer-
ators with positive probability. At the end of round 2, one scenario is randomly picked
to be executed (each with probability 1/2). Within that scenario, a random draw decides
whether the t = 1 or t = 2 allocation is implemented. If the inter-temporal scenario is
drawn, one interest rate is randomly picked (each with probability 1/3). This design en-
sures all decisions are consequential with positive probability, and rules out income effects
across different scenarios.
We define a participant as present-biased if s/he reallocates away from their future
consumption in this scenario between decision rounds, decreasing their round-3 average
consumption across interest rates when making the decision at round 2 relative to when
making the decision at round 1.31
A direct way to rule out that parent-biased reversals are driven by different β’s is
by testing directly for asymmetric quasi-hyperbolic discounting for AGD parents in our
data. If parents have different betas, then the slope of the schedule of budget shares
allocated to children should change between rounds (since, at round 2, one of the periods
is in the present). Appendix G.4.2 tests this hypothesis, rejecting that AGD parents are
systematically less present-biased about their children’s future consumption than about
their own.
Incidentally, the experimental scenario whereby parents make inter-temporal decisions
for their own consumption allows evaluating whether parents’ (expected) marginal utility
of consumption changes across decisions rounds (as discussed in the previous subsection),
by testing whether the slope of consumption trajectories with respect to the interest rate







that not to be the case in Section 5.4.
3.2.6 Indifference between integer allocations
In our baseline experiment, participants have to make integer allocations decisions over
an odd number of packages within each period. This design choice aims at mitigating
experimenter demand bias by ruling out the possibility of an egalitarian split focal point.
Having said that, this feature could have brought about a different concern: unable to
implement even splits within each round, some participants might have tried to set up
even splits on average – i.e. (2,3) and (3,2) allocations to be consumed at rounds 2 and
30To help with comprehension,the enumerators showed the respondents the options they could chose
from, for each interest rate. Figure C.1 shows this for r = 0.5.
31Formally, let sk3,i(r) be the share of packages allocated to be received t = 3 by participant i when
deciding at t = k, for interest rate r. Present-bias is then defined as:










3 by themselves and by their child, respectively, or, similarly, (3,2) and (2,3). In the
latter case, we would classify those parents as AGD preferences when, in truth, they are
merely trying to enforce equal splits. What is more, those parents might reverse future
consumption plans for their children between rounds 1 and 2 not because of parent-bias
but, rather, because they are indifferent between (2,3) and (3,2) allocations at round 3.
To deal with that concern, we re-run round 1 of the experiment twice in a follow-up
wave, conducted six months after the first one: one version exactly as in the baseline,
and another version in which participants split consumption between themselves and their
children allowing for half-package increments – including the possibility of splitting peanuts
equally with the child within each round.32 We show that this design feature does not drive
parent-bias in subsection 5.4.3.
3.2.7 Measurement error and communication between rounds
Replicating the experiment at the follow-up wave also allows us to deal with two other
critical identification concerns. The first is measurement error. As discussed, choices might
express preferences with error. If such error is correlated over time, then it would generate
spurious correlation between setting time-increasing consumption shares to children across
both rounds (model’s prediction #1). Moreover, unless measurement error is perfectly
correlated over time, it would also generate a spurious correlation between setting a high
budget share to be consumed by children at the very last round (naturally more common
among AGD parents) and downwards revisions at round 2 (model’s prediction #2).
The second additional identification concern is communication between rounds. If
parents who set different dynamic patterns for children’s consumption at round 1 learn
about each other’s plans before round 2 and feel pressured to change their plans in the
next round (e.g. because of social expectations), that would make downwards revisions by
AGD parents relative to symmetric parents prevalent at round 2 (model’s prediction #2).
Although very different in nature, that issue ends up looking exactly like measurement
error, since it would tend to make allocation plans for different sets of parents to move in
different directions across rounds.
We combine the baseline and follow-up experiments to discard observations from sub-
jects who are not consistently symmetric or consistently AGD across experiments. As
those who no longer set time-increasing allocations 6 months later (or who only then do
so) are the ones most likely to have their choices express measurement error or conformity
pressures, doing so allows us to test whether our results are likely to be driven by those
issues. Section 5.4 documents that our results are very robust to that procedure.
32As we do not replicate round 2 of the experiment in the follow-up wave, we cannot document the
extent of preference reversals at that time. Nevertheless, we document that AGD preferences measured at
follow-up are significantly correlated with investments in children outside the lab; see Section 5.5.
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3.3 Mitigating parent-bias
Next, we turn to interventions with the potential to mitigate parent-bias. To evaluate the
causal effects of those interventions on preference reversals driven by AGD preferences, our
experiment cross-randomizes respondents to a framing intervention and to different offers
of commitment to their round-1 decisions.
3.3.1 Framing allocation decisions
Thaler (1999) suggests that earmarking funds for specific uses could help individuals resist
the temptation to use them for different purposes. In the context of investment decisions
by the poor, earmarking lock-boxes to facilitate savings for health care has been evaluated
by Dupas & Robinson (2013), with mixed results (effective for emergency spending, but
ineffective for preventive health care). We evaluate whether labeling budget shares as
previously allocated to children prevents AGD parents from parent-biased reallocations in
the context of our experiment.
We randomly assign participants to one out of three conditions. In the control con-
dition, participants make their round-2 decisions starting from empty plates, just as all
participants do at round 1. In the labeling condition, participants’ decision at round 2
starts from their round-1 allocation: enumerators set up the initial distribution of peanuts
across plates so as to match the allocation set by each participant at the previous round.
Last, in the anchoring condition, participants start from a random allocation of peanuts
across plates.
Across all experimental arms, participants are free to change allocations as they please,
regardless of initial conditions. The labeling condition allows us to test whether salience or
mental accounting could mitigate parent-bias. If labeling ultimately affects AGD parents’
allocations at round 2, the anchoring condition could help understand whether its effect
is driven by framing effects in general, or if there is something special about making past
promises to children more salient.
3.3.2 Commitment to future plans
Next, we describe how we offer participants the opportunity to commit to their planned
allocations. At round 1, after making allocation decisions across both experimental scenar-
ios, all participants are offered the possibility to commit to their round-1 decision by taking
up a probabilistic commitment device, in the spirit of Augenblick et al. (2015). This device
decreases the likelihood that the allocation set by parents at round 2 is implemented. With-
out commitment, the round-1 allocation is implemented with a 10% probability; with com-
mitment, that probability increases to 90%.33 We elicit demand for commitment against
present-bias and parent-biased separately, allowing participants’ take-up decision to vary
across experimental scenarios.
33That design ensure that even those who take up commitment make allocation decisions in both round,
and that all allocation decisions are consequential.
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We randomize the price of commitment: committing to round-1 decisions require par-
ticipants to forego packages of peanuts from their own round-3 allocation (0.5, 1 or 1.5,
randomly drawn with equal probabilities, and the same in the within-household and inter-
temporal scenarios).34,35 Participants were asked a series of questions to ensure that they
understood how the commitment device worked before being asked whether they wanted
to commit to their round-1 choice.
Importantly, round-1 allocation decisions are made before the parents are offered the
possibility to take up commitment and explained how commitment is billed and parents
are not offered the possibility to revise that decision at this stage. For this reason, we
do not deduct the price of commitment from parents’ consumption at round 3 for those
who take it up, to avoid artificially making many more subjects look like AGD when they
actually did not allocate time-increase budget shares to children at that point in time.
Appendix G.1.1 shows that learning about costly commitment between decision rounds
is not consequential for our analyses. Table ?? documents that the price of commitment is
not systematically associated with parent-biased reversals among those who take it up, and
that the association between AGD preferences and the model’s predictions is unaffected by
allowing commitment price to affect allocations differentially for different planning horizons
or at different decision rounds.
Table 1 summarizes the randomization process and the different treatment arms.
Table 1: Distribution of participants per treatment cell in the baseline experiment
hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhPrice of commitment
Framing Control Labeling Anchoring Total
0.5 263 127 125 515
1 254 137 134 525
1.5 300 141 146 587
Total 817 405 405 1,627
3.4 Investments and demand for commitment outside the lab
3.4.1 Real-life investments in children
Even though Section 2.2 establishes that the patterns for how AGD parents allocate con-
sumption over-time between themselves and their children in the absence of inter-temporal
trade-offs should also translate to the investment case, the artificial setup of our experiment
has limits in what it allows us to say about the connection between AGD preferences and
investments in children outside the lab. For this reason, we survey parents about real-life
investments in children’s health and education at the end of round 3 of the experiment, to
study whether AGD parents actually invest less in their children than symmetric geometric
discounters.
34Figure C.2 displays the visual aid the enumerators showed the respondents.
35We avoided having subjects pay for commitment early rather than later to avoid low take-up driven
by impatience (Casaburi & Willis, 2018).
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Naturally, there are several challenges in documenting a causal relationship between
AGD preferences and lower investments in children outside the lab. First, as discussed in
Section 3.1, AGD preferences are measured with error, not only because there are other
(potentially rational) reasons for why parents might set time-increasing budget shares
allocated to children at round 1, but also because there is noise in the process through
which economic choices express preferences (Woodford, 2020). We already mentioned that
measurement error only allows us to detect statistical relationships in the data, and makes
it less likely that we are able to detect those relationships.
Second, even in the absence of measurement error, the preferences elicited through
our experiments might not be the ones relevant for decisions outside the lab. As we only
capture time preferences of one decision-maker in the household (mostly mothers), it might
be that real-life investment decisions reflect a combination of other preferences or even that,
in an extreme case, are entirely determined by preferences we cannot observe.
Third, such preferences are not randomly assigned, such that AGD parents might
display other characteristics associated with higher investments in children when contrasted
with other parents (rather than with their counterfactual symmetric selves).
With those caveats in mind, we estimate the correlation between AGD preferences and
real-life investments in children in section 5.5. We survey parents about actual investments
in their children’s education and health in the recent past, restricting attention to the child
involved in the experiment. For children younger than 5 years old, we elicit expenses in
preventive health care, child nutrition and early childhood programs, whether the child
was subject to regular medical check-ups and attendance of early childhood development
programs (these last two to capture parents’ opportunity cost of time). For children 6 years
old or older, we elicit school attendance, educational expenses incurred by parents, and
parental engagement in their children’s education (the latter to capture parents’ opportu-
nity cost of time). The complete set of components for each index is listed in Appendix
C.2.
We try to mitigate concerns about AGD preferences conflating other individual pref-
erence parameters by controlling for a range of parents’ characteristics, including their
discount rate δ̂i, inferred from their allocation decisions in the inter-temporal scenario (see
Appendix E).
3.4.2 Commitment to real-life investments children
The extent to which AGD parents demand commitment in the lab could be a mislead-
ing indication of their demand for commitment outside of it, especially in the presence
of experimenter demand bias. For this reason, in the follow-up wave we elicit parents’
willingness to commit resources to a real investment in their children’s education.
To do that, we enter study participants into a lottery for a chance to win 2,000 kwachas
(about 2 dollars at the time of the experiment), which they would receive approximately
two months after the survey in case they won. Before learning the outcome of the lottery,
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parents could choose to either receive the prize in cash or to commit those proceeds to
one week of tutoring for their child (1 hour a day, for a week), delivered by a local NGO
that offers those services regularly outside of the experiment. To elicit parents’ willingness
to pay for commitment, the flexible option comes with extra cash (a bonus), and we ask
participants to choose between flexibility or commitment for different bonus amounts. At
the end of the survey, one bonus is randomly picked and the participants’ decision for
that amount is implemented – a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism (Becker
et al., 1964) that ensures that respondents’ answers are incentive-compatible.36 Since
attaching a bonus to the flexible option may induce experimenter demand bias, we also ask
participants to chose between the flexible or commitment option with extra cash attached
to commitment, following Carrera et al. (2019).37
We also offer parents the opportunity to commit lottery proceeds to a savings account
under the child’s name. We actually follow through on this decision for lottery winners who
opt into the account, having enumerators accompany them to a local bank. To disentangle
demand for commitment against parent-bias from demand for a savings account more
generally, we also elicit parents’ willingness to pay for a bank account earmarked to their
child relative to an account under their own name.
4 New stylized facts about parents’ dynamic allocations
This section documents the two new stylized facts about how parents systematically plan
to and effectively allocate resources between themselves and their children over time, in
subsections 4.1 and 4.2.
4.1 Stylized fact #1: For many parents, budget shares allocated to chil-
dren increase with the time gap between the decision and actual
consumption
Figure 2 presents the distribution of parents’ round-1 allocations to their child’s consump-
tion at rounds 2 and 3. The distribution of children’s planned consumption at round 3 is
shifted to the right relative to that at round 2. In other words, parents tend to be more
generous towards their children further in the future, the larger the time gap between the
decision and actual consumption.
36To ensure that the participants understand this experiment, they first do a practice run to measure
their willingness to pay for a bar of soap.
37This has the additional advantage of allowing us to assess how well understood this part of the ex-
periment was by identifying respondents who exhibit a positive WTP for both the flexible option and the
commitment. This is the case for only 18% of respondents who had chosen to commit lottery proceedings
to tutoring; we exclude those participants from our regression analyses.
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Figure 2: Parent’s decisions: number of peanuts allocated to the child
(a) Round-1 decision (b) Round-2 decision
Notes: Panel (a) illustrates the distribution of round-1 allocation decisions; Panel (b) focuses on round-2
allocation decisions. On the x-axis is the number of peanuts respondent allocated to be consumed by their
children at round 2 (white bars) or round 3 (black bars). The height of each bar represents the percentage
of parents who chose each allocation at each round.
At round 2, we observe very similar patterns. Figure 2 shows that, given the chance
to revise their round-1 decisions, it is still the case that the distribution of consumption
plans allocated to children at round 3 is shifted to the right relative to that set at round
2. 29.2% of parents allocate increasing shares of consumption to their children over time
at that point, after which they have no further possibility of revising consumption plans.
Among those parents, the average round-3 allocation set to children is 45% larger than the
average allocation set for immediate consumption.
Allocating time-increasing budget shares to children is uncorrelated with liquidity con-
straints or hunger, minimizing concerns that this pattern is merely driven by fungibility
with consumption outside of the experiment or projection bias.38
Having said that, there are other, rational reasons for why parents might set time-
increasing consumption patterns for their children relative to their own: in particular,
they might expect different paths for their marginal utility of future consumption, e.g. be-
cause they might attribute different survival probabilities to themselves and their children.
Alternatively, parents might anticipate that, upon enjoying the consumption of peanuts
are round 2, their children will demand a larger amount of peanuts in the next round (akin
to habit formation).
In contrast, preference reversals cannot be accommodated by such rational expecta-
tions, especially when it comes to reallocation away from consumption plans still in the
future, only two days after those plans were set. The next subsection turns to this stylized
fact.
38The correlation coefficient between time-increasing budget shares allocated to the child and self-
reported liquidity constraints is −0.012 (p = 0.6401), and that between the former and hunger is −0.001
for that reported by parents (p = 0.9559)and 0.02 for that reported for children (p = 0.4573).
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4.2 Stylized fact #2: Many parents revise planned allocations to chil-
dren downwards even before consumption time
For this analysis, we restrict attention to parents in the control group of the framing
intervention, to capture the extent of preference reversals in the absence of interventions
with the potential to mitigate them. The probabilistic commitment device does not affect
our analysis because round-2 decisions can still be implemented with positive probability
(see Section 3.3.2). Figure 3 presents average round-1 and round-2 budget shares allocated
to children to be consumed at round 3. 14.3% of parents reallocate away from their
children’s planned future consumption when given the opportunity to revise their decision,
only two days later.
Figure 3: Reallocations
(a) Average t = 3 children’s share of consumption among
parents who allocate less to their children than planned
Parent-bias
(b) Average t = 3 share of consumption among parents
who allocate less to the future than planned
Present-bias
Notes: Panel (a) shows the average pattern for children’s consumption share at t = 3 set by respondents who
revise their original planned allocation to their children at that round towards their own consumption (14.3% of
our sample). Panel (b) shows the average pattern for one’s own consumption at t = 3 set by respondents who
revise their original planned allocation to their consumption at that round towards the earlier round (43.6% of our
sample). In both panels, we restrict attention to the sub-sample is the control group of the framing experiment.
The extent of reallocation is large. The left-hand-side panel of Figure 3 documents
a 36.5% reduction in the share of consumption allocated to the child between decision
rounds. Reallocating away from children’s future consumption is uncorrelated with changes
in liquidity constraints or hunger between rounds.39
It is useful to compare those reallocations to those induced by present-bias, presented
in the right-hand-side panel of Figure 3, captured through the alternative experimental
scenario in which parents set inter-temporal allocations for their own consumption. In
that scenario (also restricting attention to parents in the control group of the framing
intervention in the main experiment, to ensure comparability), 43.6% of the respondents
reallocate away from their future consumption. While present-bias is about three times
39The correlation coefficient between reallocations away from children’s future consumption and changes
to self-reported liquidity constraints between rounds is −0.01 (p = 0.84), and that between the former
and changes to hunger between rounds is 0.02 for that reported by parents (p = 0.32) and −0.02 for that
reported for children (p = 0.37).
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as prevalent as reallocating away from children’s future consumption, the magnitude of
present-biased reallocations is smaller : for those parents, round-3 consumption decreases
by 23.6% on average.
5 Testing the model’s predictions
Our simple model yields testable predictions connecting AGD preferences to the two styl-
ized facts from the previous section. First, AGD parents’ budget shares allocated to
children should increase with the time gap between the decision and actual consumption
(to a greater extent than symmetric parents). Second, AGD parents should revise future
allocations to children downwards as the planning horizon gets shorter (to a greater ex-
tent than symmetric parents). Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 test these hypotheses, followed by
a summary of results’ heterogeneity in subsection 5.3 and robustness tests in subsection
5.4. Next, we evaluate whether AGD preferences are predictive of real-life investments in
children in subsection 5.5. Last, subsection 5.6 computes welfare losses associated with
AGD preferences by calibrating the investment model with parameter estimates based on
parents’ allocation decisions in the experiment.
5.1 Prediction #1: AGD parents’ budget shares allocated to children
increase with the time gap between the decision and actual con-
sumption
We categorize about 30% of parents in our sample as AGD, based on setting time-increasing
budget shares to their children at round 1. The model predicts that AGD parents should
allocate time-increasing budget shares to their children also at round 2 (to a greater extent
than symmetric parents).
We test this hypothesis formally with the following regression:






1{θ̂i < 1} × (j − 2)
)
+ λXi + εij , (7)
where s2j,i is the share of peanuts parent i allocates to their child at t = 2 to be consumed
at t = j ∈ {2, 30}; (j − 2) is the number of days between the decision and consumption;
1{θ̂i < 1} equals 1 if parent i sets time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 1,
and 0 otherwise; Xi a vector of individual characteristics; and εij is an error term. We are
interested in testing γ2 ≥ 0.
Panel A of Table 2 presents the results, restricting attention to the control group of
the framing experiment. Consistent with the model’s prediction, AGD parents set time-
increasing budget shares to their children at round 2 to a much greater extent: 58.1%
of them do so, compared to only 17.6% of symmetric parents. Column (1) shows that
such large and statistically significant difference is nearly unchanged after controlling for
individual characteristics. Column (2) tests prediction #1 directly. On the one hand,
symmetric parents do not systematically set time-increasing budget shares at round 2 (the
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coefficient of j−2 is not statistically significant and very close to zero); on the other hand,
children of AGD parents are allocated a substantially higher share of peanuts 28 days later
(8.7 p.p. higher on average, significant at the 1% level and equivalent to 17% of the mean
consumption share symmetric parents allocate to children at round 2).
Table 2: Testing the model’s predictions
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2 Panel C: Present-bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1{s230 > s22} s2j 1{s030 > s230} sk30 1{s030 > s230} sk30 sk30r
j − 2 0.000026 1{k = 2} 0.0530*** 0.0181*** 0.0969***
(0.0002) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0070)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.403*** -0.0196** 1{θ̂ < 1} 0.270*** 0.186*** 1{β̂ < 1} 0.0237 -0.0054 0.106***
(0.0357) (0.0087) (0.0323) (0.0081) (0.0254) (0.0101) (0.0126)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0031*** 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.118*** 1{β̂ < 1} 0.001 -0.299***
×(j − 2) (0.0004) ×1{k = 2} (0.0116) ×1{k = 2} (0.0112) (0.0119)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.536 0.328 0.612 0.328 0.612 0.762
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.513 0.063 0.487 0.063 0.487 0.747
N 795 1590 795 1608 795 1590 4770
Respondents 795 795 795 813 795 795 795
Sample Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
Notes: Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to children increase with time
horizon between the decision and consumption; Panel B tests model’s prediction #2 that AGD parents’
allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30) decreases when the decision is made
at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1; and Panel C studies the impact of present-bias on preference
reversals. In column (1), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to
her child at round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (2), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts set to
be consumed by the child at t = j for decisions made in round-2 (k = 2); participants’ allocations for each
consumption horizon j are stacked for the analysis. In columns (3) and (5), the outcome variable equals
1 if the parent set a lower consumption share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision
was made at t = 2 relative to when it was made at t = 0. In columns (4) and (6), the outcome variable
is the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30 when the decision is made at t = k; ; participants’
allocations for each decision round k are stacked for the analysis. In column (7), the outcome variable is
the share of peanuts allocated to herself at t = 30 in the inter-temporal scenario when the decision was
made at t = k under interest rate r; participants’ allocations for each decision round k and under each
interest rate r are stacked for the analysis. Across all columns, the sample is restricted to the control
group of the framing experiment. Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the
gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, the number of children in the household, an
indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which the inter-temporal
and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Strikingly, panel A of Table 2 also shows that, despite such ambitious plans, AGD
parents actually allocate systematically less to their children in the present: at round 2,
they set a 1.96 p.p. lower share of peanuts to their children’s consumption relative to
symmetric parents (statistically significant at the 5% level).
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5.2 Prediction #2: AGD parents decrease budget shares allocated to
children in the future as it gets closer to consumption time
The model also predicts that, between rounds 1 and 2, AGD parents should decrease
budget shares allocated to their children at round 3 (to a greater extent than symmetric
parents).
We test this hypothesis formally with the following regression:






1{θ̂i < 1} × 1{k = 2}
)
+ λXik + εik, (8)
where sk30,i is the share of peanuts parent i allocates to their child at t = k ∈ {0, 2} to be
consumed at t = 30; 1{k = 2} equals 1 for allocation decisions undertaken at round 2, and
0 otherwise; 1{θ̂i < 1} equals 1 if parent i sets time-increasing budget shares to her child
at round 1, and 0 otherwise; Xik a vector of (time-varying) individual characteristics; and
εik is an error term. We are interested in testing γ2 ≤ 0.
Panel B of Table 2 presents the results, restricting attention to the control group of the
framing experiment. AGD parents are 5 times as likely as symmetric parents to reallocate
away from their children’s consumption at round 2 relative to plans set just two days
before. Column (3) shows that such large and statistically significant difference is nearly
unchanged after controlling for individual characteristics. Column (4) tests prediction #2
directly. At round 2, AGD parents reallocate 11.8 p.p. more away from their children’s
future consumption plans set at round 1 relative to symmetric parents. This is a large effect
size, 24% of the average budget share allocated by symmetric parents to be consumed by
children at round 3 (statistically significant at the 1% level).
Last, Panel C of Table 2 shows that present-bias does not predict parent-bias in our
sample. If anything, parents with quasi-hyperbolic discounting preferences tend to increase
their children’s future allocation between decision rounds, relative to symmetric respon-
dents (column 5; not statistically significant). In the specification that specifically tests
prediction #2 (column 6), the coefficient of present-bias is nearly zero. That is the case
even though quasi-hyperbolic discounting is associated with sizeable reallocation away from
participants’ own future consumption at round 2 (column 7), when the latter is traded off
against current consumption.
5.3 Heterogeneity
Appendix F investigates which household and individual characteristics predict AGD pref-
erences, and replicates the analyses of the two previous subsections splitting the sample
by the child’s gender, age and birth order. We find that no characteristic systematically
predicts AGD preferences, and that the impacts of those preferences on dynamic allocation
patterns, including parent-bias, do not vary systematically with the child’s characteristics.
AGD preferences do seem to matter differentially when it comes to real-life investments,
but slicing the sample by characteristics makes it challenging to precisely detect differences
in coefficients of the interaction between AGD and the discount factor. Among 6-12 year-
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old children, investments in health and education seem to decrease much faster at the
high-end of the patience distribution among AGD parents of girls and first-born children,
although differences in coefficients are not statistically significant at the 10% level.
5.4 Robustness checks
As discussed in Section 3.2, we implement design choices in our experiment to minimize
concerns with issues such as fungibility, projection bias and experimenter demand bias.
Moreover, Section 4 discusses correlational evidence that liquidity constraints and pro-
jection bias (or changes in those) are uncorrelated with the prevalence of the behaviors
characterized by the two facts across parents in our sample. In this section, we summarize
a series of robustness tests to rule out additional identification concerns. Subsection 5.4.1
presents direct tests of the hypothesis that our experimental currency was not fungible
with children’s consumption outside the lab. Subsection 5.4.2 documents direct tests of
the hypothesis that parent-bias is not driven by shocks between decision rounds. Next, we
show that our findings for model’s prediction #2 are not driven by indifference between in-
teger allocations (subsection 5.4.3) neither by measurement error or communication across
subjects between rounds (subsection 5.4.4). Subsection 5.4.5 showcases that parent-bias
is also not driven by changes in the salience of fairness towards siblings of the child par-
ticipating in the experiment between decision rounds. Last, subsection 5.4.6 documents
that the predictive power of AGD preferences for parent-biased reversals is not an artifact
of other preference features that could be associated with setting time-increasing budget
shares at round 1, controlling flexibly for the consumption shares set to children at that
round when testing model’s prediction #2.
5.4.1 Parents consider adjusting consumption outside of the experiment, but
fail to follow through
Appendix G.3 analyzes the correlation between the time elapsed since children’s last meal
(reported by parents before consumption decisions are implemented) and budget shares
allocated to children within the experiment. Interestingly, parents seem to systematically
adjust children’s consumption outside of the experiment in anticipation of peanuts set to
be consumed by them at round 2: the number of hours since children last ate correlates
positively and significantly with their consumption share assigned by parents two days
before.
Having said that, parents do not follow through on those plans: there is no systematic
correlation between the time since children’s last meal and their actual consumption share
allocated by parents at round 2 – when allocation decisions can no longer be revised.
Moreover, when we ask parents about whether children participating in the experiment
are hungry (again, before consumption decisions are implemented), even though nearly
half of them responds affirmatively, their answers do not systematically correlate with
round-2 allocation plans set to children either in the present or two days before.
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5.4.2 Parent-bias is not driven by shocks to the (expected) marginal utility
of consumption between rounds
To rule out that shocks between decision rounds induce preference reversals, we estimate
whether parents’ round-2 consumption in the inter-temporal experimental scenario re-
sponds differentially to interest rates across decision rounds. As discussed in Section 3.2,
in an interior solution, parents equalize the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption within
each round to the ratio of gross interest rates under which parents trade off consumption
over time; as such, shocks to parents’ (expected) marginal utility of consumption should
translate into changes in their responses to interest rates. Appendix G.4 shows that is not
the case: the slope of parents’ round-2 consumption with respect to interest rates does not
systematically change between rounds 1 and 2.
Because this test cannot directly rule out shocks to children’s (expected) marginal
utility of consumption, Appendix G.1.1 provides additional tests for the hypothesis of no
systematic shocks between decision rounds. First, we control for village fixed-effects, as
negative shocks (such as droughts or floods) often affect many households in a village.
This does not affect our estimates in testing model’s predictions for AGD preferences, nor
their significance levels. Second, we cluster standard errors at the village level, allowing
shocks to be arbitrarily correlated at that level. If anything, this increases the precision of
our estimates. Last, we control for the day of the month in which the enumerator’s visit
took place, in order to avoid any payday effects that could induce systematic differences
between decision rounds, for instance if distance to payday increases on average between
rounds for those who set time-increasing consumption shares to their children at round 1.
For prediction #1, we interact the number of days between the decision and consumption
(j − 2) with an indicator of when the visit took place, whether in the first or second half
of the month. For prediction # 2, we interact this indicator of the visit date with an
indicator of allocation decisions undertaken at round 2 (1{k = 2}).40 Our estimates and
their precision levels in each case are unaffected.
5.4.3 Parent-bias is not driven by indifference between integer allocations
Could time-increasing budget shares allocated to children be an artifact of our experimen-
tal design, which only allows for integer allocations, leading some parents to allocate even
splits on average (see Section 3.2.6)? Figure 2 shows that, consistent with the desire to
be egalitarian across rounds, the majority of parents choose [(2,3);(3,2)] or [(3,2);(2,3)]
allocations – where the first and second parentheses indicate allocations to be consumed at
rounds 2 and 3 by themselves (first argument) and by their child (second argument), respec-
tively. Having said that, even among such egalitarian parents, 33.7% choose [(2,3);(3,2)]
and 66.3% choose [(3,2);(2,3)]; as such, the majority is more generous towards their child
later in the future. Moreover, Figure A.2 shows that allowing for non-integer allocations
40We restrict our sample to observations for whom visit dates were accurately recorded by enumerators,
which leads to approximately 80 observations being dropped across different specifications.
29
(including even splits in the parents’ budget set within each round) at the follow-up wave
still yields the same stylized fact.
[Figure A.2]
Figure A.2’s left-hand-side panel displays round-1 allocations at the follow-up wave
when parents were only allowed to choose integer allocations, while the right-hand-side
panel displays allocations when half-package increments were allowed (including even splits
within each period). In the RHS panel, 20.3% of respondents still allocate increasing budget
shares to their children (compared to 23.2% in the LHS panel). This rules out that time-
increasing budget shares allocated to children are an artifact of parents trying to implement
even splits on average.
5.4.4 Parent-bias is not driven by measurement error and communication
between rounds
As discussed in Section 3.2.7, we address concerns with measurement error and communi-
cation between different sets of parents between decision rounds by restricting our sample
to parents who were consistently AGD or consistently symmetric across the baseline and
follow-up experiments. The rationale is that parents who set time-increasing consumption
shares to their children at round 1 are less likely to be subject to measurement error or
to have changed their round-2 allocations due to conformity pressures in the baseline ex-
periment. In doing so, we drop 338 participants from our sample. Table B.4 tests model’s
predictions for the remaining sample.
[Table B.4]
Results are very close to those in Table 2. In this sub-sample, the share of AGD
parents who set time-increasing shares to children at round 2 becomes even larger, and
their allocation increases to a greater extent with the planning horizon (prediction #1).
Although effect sizes marginally decrease for prediction #2, AGD parents are still 20
p.p. more likely than symmetric parents to reallocate away from their children’s future
consumption relative to their original plans (27 p.p. in the full sample), and decrease
those plans by 11.1 p.p. on average (11.8 p.p. in the full sample). All estimate remain
very precisely estimated, significant at the 1% level.
5.4.5 Parent-bias is not driven by changes in the salience of fairness towards
other children between rounds
Given more time to consider allocation decisions, it could be the case that certain parents
realize that they set too high consumption shares to the child participating in the experi-
ment, especially when confronted with his/her siblings between decision rounds, inducing
preference reversals. Since preferences are not randomly distributed, if family structure is
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systematically correlated with AGD preferences, that could lead to a spurious correlation
between those preferences and present-biased reversals.
Although Appendix F showcases that individual or household characteristics do not
systematically predict AGD preferences, we can also test for this hypothesis directly by
restricting attention to participants with just one child. For those subjects, there can be
no influence of siblings in subsequent allocation decisions.
[Table B.3]
Table B.3 shows that restricting the analysis to that sub-sample does not weaken the
correlation between AGD and time-increasing shares nor the correlation between AGD and
parent-biased reversals.
5.4.6 AGD preferences are not an artifact of other preference features
More broadly, we consider whether the correlation between AGD preferences and parent-
bias could be driven by the fact that the former are also systematically different when it
comes to other preference parameters. In particular, it could be the case that AGD parents
actually care less about peanuts than other parents, leading them to take their decisions
within the experiment less seriously. If that were the case, AGD preferences would not
only exhibit reversals to a greater extent than other parents, but higher variance more
generally.
Table B.2 captures participants’ preferences by controlling flexibly for their round-1
allocation decisions when testing for the relationship between AGD preferences and parent-
bias, in columns (1) and (2), and by testing directly for whether AGD preferences lead to
higher variance of allocations, in columns (3) and (4). Columns (1) and (2) feature the
change between rounds in allocations set to be consumed by children at round 3 as the
outcome, controlling for the round-1 consumption share allocated to the child two days
ahead in column (1), and for its quadratic and cubic terms in column (2). Columns (3)
and (4) feature the square of the change between rounds in allocations set to be consumed
by children at round 3 as the outcome, as a measure of variance.
[Table B.2]
In Table B.2, controlling flexibly for round-1 decisions does not change results: if
anything, that actually increases the estimated effect of AGD preferences on parent-biased
reallocations relative to symmetric parents. We also do not find evidence that AGD parents
exhibit systematically higher variance of allocations thanz symmetric parents.
5.5 Investments in children outside the lab
Next, we assess whether AGD preferences are predictive of real-life investments in children.
As discussed in Section 3.4, we analyze the correlation between AGD preferences and self-
reported investments in children’s education and health.
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Since we elicit multiple outcomes to capture parental investments in children, we con-
trol for family-wise error rate in the context of multiple hypotheses testing by building a
summary measure of investments in children Kling et al. (2007). We pre-registered that we
would analyze separately investments in children between 3 and 5 years old and those be-
tween 6 and 12 years old. Each summary index measure is the equally weighted average of
its standardized components.41 We normalize each component by the mean and standard
deviations of symmetric parents.
In the analyses, we control for individual characteristics, including the extent to which
parents discount their own future consumption elicited in the inter-temporal experimental
scenario.42 We allow the effects of AGD preferences to vary with parents’ discount rate,
δ̂i.
We formally test whether AGD preferences are predictive of real-life investments in
children with the following regression:




+ γ2δ̂i + γ3
(
1{θ̂i < 1} × δ̂i
)
+ λXi + εi, (9)
where Yi is a summary measure of investments in parent i’ child; 1{θ̂i < 1} equals 1
if parent i sets time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 1, and 0 otherwise;
δ̂i is parent i’s discount rate inferred from the experiment; Xi is a vector of individual
characteristics; and εi is the error term. We are interested in testing γ1 ≤ 0 and γ3 ≤ 0.
Table B.5 shows the results, restricting attention to 3-5 year-olds in the two columns
reported under (1) and 6-12 year-olds in the two columns reported under (2).
[Table B.5]
Both columns showcase similar patterns: the correlation between AGD preferences
with real-life investments in children is nearly the same as that between the latter and
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Among impatient parents, AGD and quasi-hyperbolic pref-
erences are actually associated with higher investments in children. As parents’ patience
increases, however, the correlation between each type of time preferences and investments
decreases, and eventually becomes negative at the high-end of the patience distribution.
As a bechmark, for parents with δ̂ = 0.996 (the median among AGD parents is 0.994), the
effect of AGD preferences on investments in 6-12 year-old children is sizable, roughly 1/3
of the effect of being downgraded from primary school to having no education.
In sum, parent-bias seems to matter for real-life investments in children’s human capital
just as much as present-bias, especially among parents who value the future to a greater
extent.
41Appendix C.2 presents all details.
42Appendix E presents all details on how we compute preference parameters for each participant based
on their allocation decisions in the experiment.
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5.6 Welfare consequences of AGD preferences
Last, we estimate welfare losses due to AGD preferences, calibrating our simple investment
model (Section 2.2) with the parameter estimates based on parents’ allocation decisions in
the main experiment.
Welfare comparisons for subjects with time-inconsistent preferences are challenging,
since welfare analyses traditionally assumes stable preferences (Bernheim & Taubinsky,
2019). Analogously to O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999), we use the symmetric geometric dis-
counter agent as the normative standard (θ = 1). We further assume that this agent’s
decision at t = 1 perfectly overlaps with the child’s preferences at that point. This allows
us to derive parent’s long-run utility, and estimate welfare losses as the monetary com-
pensation that a symmetric agent would require to achieve the same long-run utility as an
AGD parent (as a % of their income).
As in Section 2.2, we assume that the parent’s and the child’s instantaneous utility
function is CRRA, with coefficient of relative risk aversion γ. We calibrate welfare calcu-
lations with the median values of α̂, and δ̂ among AGD parents in our sample (inferred
from allocation decisions with the help of this functional form assumption), and setting
γ = 1.73 (the average value of the CRRA coefficient in Holden & Quiggin, 2017 within
a sample of Malawian subjects). All details of the calibration procedure are presented in
Appendix E.
Because of model’s prediction #1, our simulations yield welfare losses proportional to
the time gap between decisions and investment payout (what we call the planning horizon).
When the planning horizon is short (e.g. a month), welfare losses are rather small: at the
median value of θ̂ in our sample, they are less than 1% of the income-equivalent long-run
utility of the symmetric agent even for the naive type. When the planning horizon is long,
however, welfare losses are substantial. Figure A.3 plots the income that a symmetric agent
would require to obtain the same long-term utility as naive/sophisticated AGD parent with
income y = 1 when the planning horizon is a year.
[Figure A.3]
Figure A.3 shows that naive agents with θ = 0.993 (the median value of θ̂ among AGD
parents in our sample) reach a long-run utility equivalent to that of a symmetric agent with
24.5% lower income. Sophistication only partially mitigates welfare losses: sophisticated
AGD agents’ long-run utility is equivalent to that of a symmetric agent with 18% lower
income in that case.
6 Testing interventions to mitigate parent-bias
In this section, we analyze interventions designed to mitigate parent-bias, with the help
of additional experiments. We start by documenting in subsection 6.1 that participants’
characteristics are balanced across Figure 1’s treatment cells, and that attrition between
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rounds is not systematically correlated with treatment assignment. Next, subsection 6.2
investigates whether a framing intervention – reminding parents of their initial decision
– decreases reallocation away from children’s consumption among AGD parents. Last,
subsection 6.3 investigates AGD parents’ demand for commitment, in the lab and when it
comes to real-life decisions.
Appendix G.8 presents all details of an alternative intervention which we pre-registered
as a potential alternative to mitigate present-bias: child participation. We document the
effects of having the child be present at parent’s round-2 decision, and elicit parents’
willingness to pay for it. We relegate those results to supplementary materials because,
as discussed in Appendix D.2, including children as part of the decision problem yields
ambiguous theoretical predictions for dynamic allocation decisions.
6.1 Balance and selective attrition tests
Table B.1 shows that our sample is balanced across the different treatment arms of the fram-
ing experiment and across the different prices of commitment in the baseline experiment.
Appendix G.2 discusses selective attrition. Roughly 97% of participants were surveyed in
all three rounds of the baseline experiment, and we were able to track 91% of participants
in the 6-month follow-up. Attrition across rounds within the baseline experiment, or across
the baseline and follow-up waves, is uncorrelated with treatment assignment or with AGD
preferences.
6.2 Framing allocation decisions
Does reminding AGD parents about their previous decision mitigate parent-bias? To
study that question, we randomly assign the starting point of participants’ allocation
decisions at round 2, as discussed in Section 3.3.1. We are interested in the effects of
highlighting parent’s allocation plans set at the previous round, which we call labeling,
whereby participant’s decision at round 2 starts with enumerators sorting peanut packages
across plates to match their round-1 allocations. Because plates were explicitly labeled as
‘My own consumption’ and ‘My child’s consumption’ at each decision round, we believe
such framing intervention should prime parents pretty explicitly about past promises made
to children (or to themselves, on their behalf). In contrast, participants in the control
condition start with empty plates. The framing experiment also entailed a third condition,
which we call anchoring, whereby participant’s decision at round 2 starts with enumerators
randomly distributing peanut packages across plates, to help us understand the mechanism
behind labeling effects (if any).
We estimate the effects of the framing intervention through the following regression:
∆s30,i = α+ γ0Ti + γ11{θ̂i < 1}+ γ21{θ̂i < 1} ×Ti + λXki + εi (10)
where ∆s30,i is the difference in the share of peanuts parent i allocates to their child to
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be consumed at t = 30 when deciding at t = 2 relative to t = 0; Ti equals 1 if parent
i is assigned to condition T, and 0 otherwise; 1{θ̂i < 1} equals 1 if parent i sets time-
increasing budget shares to her child at round 1, and 0 otherwise; Xi is a vector of individual
characteristics; and εi is the error term. We are interested in testing γ2 ≤ 0.
Table B.6 presents the results.
[Table B.6]
While labeling has a positive although small and insignificant effect on children’s con-
sumption share, it does not mitigate parent-bias: if anything, it even magnifies the extent
of reallocation away from children’s planned consumption among AGD parents (column 1,
also statistically insignificant). Column (2) shows that labeling effects are undistinguish-
able from mere anchoring effects in our experiment, which also fail to prevent parent-biased
reallocations among AGD parents.
6.3 Commitment to round-1 decisions
This section studies AGD parents’ demand for commitment. We start by documenting the
extent to which participants are sophisticated about parent-bias in subsection 6.3.1. Next,
subsections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 present results on demand for commitment, testing whether
AGD preferences predict differences in take-up of different types of commitment devices,
in the lab and when it comes to real-life decisions, respectively.
6.3.1 Sophistication
As underscored by Section 2.2, sophistication matters for parental investments in children
and, naturally, should influence their demand for commitment. To what extent are parent-
biased individuals sophisticated?
We measure sophistication through participants’ predictions of future behavior. Fol-
lowing Augenblick & Rabin (2019) and Toussaert (2018), we elicit parents’ beliefs about
the future behavior of other respondents, incentivizing their responses.43
Appendix G.5 summarizes our results. We find that 1/3 of parent-biased participants
are sophisticated, quite similarly to the prevalence of sophistication among present-biased
participants (36.5%; a small and statistically insignificant difference). Incidentally, Ap-
pendix G.5 documents that sophistication is not a unidimensional feature across biases:
less than 15% of participants are sophisticated about both present-bias and parent-bias,
while roughly 34.5% are sophisticated about one but not the other.
43Concretely, enumerators state: “We are asking many other households to make those same decisions.
Do you think that, two days from now, most other people will choose to give less, more or the same amount
of peanuts to the child than they did today?” If respondents have accurately guessed the behavior of the
majority of other respondents, they get two extra packages of peanuts at the end of round 3, outside of
the experiment. Respondents learn whether their guesses were correct at the end of round 3.
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6.3.2 Demand for commitment in the lab
Demand for commitment in the lab is extremely high, surpassing 90% when it comes to the
experimental scenario involving within-household allocations, presumably due to delayed
payment, such as in Casaburi & Willis (2018). While AGD parents are slightly more likely
to take-up commitment than other parents, that difference is driven by substantially higher
demand at its lowest price – as commitment price increases, however, demand by AGD
parents falls significantly more steeply than among other parents. All in all, there is no
clear pattern linking AGD preferences and demand for commitment in the lab. Appendix
G.6 compiles those findings.
6.3.3 Demand for commitment outside the lab
Next, we evaluate whether AGD parents are more willing to commit lottery proceeds to
tutoring for their child, a real-live investment in their education. For parents with no
school-age children, we ask this question hypothetically. We analyze parent’s interest in
taking up commitment and their willingness to pay for it (since the price of commitment
is set through a BDM auction, as discussed in Section 3.4.2).
The take-up of commitment to tutoring is high: 84% of parents express interest in
receiving tutoring for their child rather than 2,000 kwachas in cash cards in case they
are drawn as lottery winners. What is more, 32% of those are actually willing to pay for
commitment. Table B.7 documents whether AGD parents are differentially likely to do so.
[Table B.7]
Table B.7 shows that, strikingly, AGD parents are actually less likely to commit lottery
proceeds to tutoring than other parents. Column (1) shows that those are 5.3 p.p. less likely
to choose tutoring over cash (significant at the 1% level, and robust to excluding parents
with children younger than 6 years old, for whom that question was asked hypothetically).
Next, column (2) documents that AGD preferences negatively correlate with willingness
to pay, a large and precisely estimated coefficient (22% of the mean willingness to pay,
significant at the 1% level).
Appendix G.7 studies parents’ demand for an alternative real-life commitment device:
committing lottery proceeds to a savings account earmarked to their child. In that case,
despite expressing significantly higher interest in commitment than symmetric parents,
AGD parents are also less willing to pay for it relative to receiving cash (a small and
statistically insignificant effect). To rule out that demand for commitment against parent-
bias conflates demand for commitment against present-bias, we ask parents who express
interest in committing lottery proceeds to a bank account whether they would rather have
that account earmarked to their child or themselves. We find that a very low share of
parents actually prefer an account earmarked to their child, and that AGD parents are no
more likely to do so. What is more, AGD parents’ willingness to pay for an account under
their child’s name relative to an account under their own name is 25% lower than that
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of symmetric parents (this effect is, however, only imprecisely estimated, as the share of
participants who express interest in committing lottery proceeds to the child in that case
is rather small).
All in all, results indicate that AGD parents do not demand commitment to investments
in children to a greater extent, either in the lab or outside of it – where, if anything, they
are less willing to pay for it.
6.3.4 AGD preferences vs. Time-increasing altruism
Incidentally, this elicitation procedure allows us to document that the implications of AGD
preferences are confined to decisions about one’s children – rather than about anyone else
as a result of time-increasing altruism towards others in general. To do so, we re-elicit
parents’ demand for commitment when it comes to allocating lottery proceeds to tutoring
someone else’s child. Since we actually implement decisions for lottery winners, we take
a few measures to prevent ceiling effects potentially driven by reciprocity motives (Fark
& Fischbacher, 2006): participants are informed that the other child would be randomly
chosen among other respondents’ children, that they would not be informed of the child’s
identity, and that the child’s family would not be informed of the sender’s identity.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table B.7 present the results. While a lower share of respon-
dents are willing to commit lottery proceeds to tutoring someone else’s child (62% of the
respondents, relative to 84% in the previous subsection), column (3) documents that AGD
parents are no less likely to do so. Along those lines, column (4) shows that AGD parents
are also no less willing to pay for commitment in that case.
We can rule out that the coefficients in columns (1) and (3) are statistically identical (at
the 10% level). The contrast between the findings in this and the previous subsection sug-
gests that AGD preferences are unlikely to merely express time-increasing altruism towards
others in general (or towards any other children). Rather, they likely apply specifically to
how parents plan and effectively share resources with their children over time.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper was born from simple observation in the field. As we conducted focus groups
with Malawian parents for a different project, in 2017, to gauge whether they understood
questions about allocation decisions over different time horizons, we noticed that parents
indicated they would like to allocate more and more resources to their children in the
future. That observation led us to try to investigate whether that phenomenon was actually
prevalent, whether it would lead to systematic preference reversals, and whether it would
matter for investments in children. It was only later that we rationalized that behavior
with a new type of time preferences. Even though it feels natural to structure the paper
the other way around, we still decided to frame it around the stylized facts at the origin
of this research, which feed the intellectual curiosity of economists (and anthropologists
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alike, as Samuelson put it).
This paper is the first to document asymmetric geometric discounting and its conse-
quences for parental investments in children. Those preferences are prevalent and lead to
sizeable reallocations away from past plans to set resources to children. They also correlate
with real-life investments in children just as much as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, and lead
to large welfare consequences for decisions with long planning horizons – such as whether
or not to pay for school fees in the following year, as in The Boy Who Harnessed the Wind.
While AGD preferences might be prevalent everywhere, their implications are expected
to be particularly dramatic in developing countries, where many investments in children’s
human capital (from immunization to cooking with clean water) are not institutionalized.
In those settings, parents have to often and actively decide to follow through on past plans
to invest in their children, making their time preferences much more consequential.
Results also suggest that parent-bias is likely hard to mitigate. First, in the absence
of commitment, we found that reminding parents of their past decisions did not decrease
parent-biased reallocations. Second, parent-bias not only requires different commitment
devices than present-bias (since lock-boxes do not prevent within-household reallocation),
but also, even when offered opportunities to commit to investments in children, AGD
parents were no more likely – and, in some cases, even less likely – to take them up.
Our findings open the door to several additional research questions. For instance, do
parents discount the future consumption of different children in the household to different
extents? If so, does that lead them to systematically reallocate resources over time despite
ambitious plans to equalize inputs across siblings (Berry et al., 2020)? Do different decision-
makers in the household vary in the extent to which they display AGD preferences? If so,
how do they interact in determining household investments in children? What are effective
and attractive commitment devices to mitigate parent-bias? We hope those conjectures




Ambuehl, S. B., Bernheim, D., & Ockenfelss, A. (2019). Projective paternalism. mimeo.
Andreoni, J., Aydin, D., Barton, B., Bernheim, B. D., & Naecker, J. (2018). When fair
isn’t fair: Understanding choice reversals involving social preferences. NBER Working
Paper(25257).
Ariely, D., & Wertenbroch, K. (2002). Procastination, deadlines, and performance: Self-
control by precommitment. Psychological Science, 13 (3).
Ashraf, N., Karlan, D., & Yin, W. (2006). Tying odysseus to the mast: Evidence from
a commitment savings product in the philippines. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
121 (1), 635–672.
Augenblick, N., Niederle, M., & Sprenger, C. (2015). Working over time: Dynamic incon-
sistency in real effort tasks. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130 (3), 1067–1115.
Augenblick, N., & Rabin, M. (2019). An experiment on time preference and misprediction
in unpleasant tasks. Review of Economic Studies, 86 (3), 941–975.
Baland, J.-M., & Ziparo, R. (2017). Intra-household bargaining in poor countries.
Banerjee, A. (2013). Microcredit under the microscope: What have we learned in the past
two decades, and what do we need to know? Annual Review of Economics, 5 , 487–519.
Banerjee, A., & Mullainathan, S. (2010). The shape of temptation: Implications for the
economic lives of the poor. NBER Working Papers, 15973 .
Barton, B. (2015). Interpersonal time inconsistency and commitment. mimeo.
Becker, G., Degroot, M. H., & Marschak, J. (1964). Measuring utility by a single-response
sequential method. Behavioral Science, 9 , 226–236.
Bernheim, D., & Taubinsky, D. (2019). Behavioral public economics. In D. Bernheim,
S. DellaVigna, & D. Laibson (Eds.), Handbook of behavioral economics (Vol. 1, p. 381-
516). Elsevier, New York.
Berry, J., Dizon-Ross, R., & Jagnani, M. (2020). Not playing favorites: An experiment on
parental fairness preferences (Tech. Rep.). NBER Working Paper No. w26732, February
2020.
Beshears, J., Choi, J. J., Harris, C., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. C., & Sakong, J. (2020).
Which early withdrawal penalty attracts the most deposits to a commitment savings
account? Journal of Public Economics, 183 (104144).
Brown, Z. E. C., Alexander L., & Camerer, C. F. (2009). Learning and visceral temptation
in dynamic saving experiments. Journal of Neuroscience, 124 (1), 197—-231.
39
Caplin, A., & Leahy, J. (2001). Psychological expected utility theory and anticipatory
feelings. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 , 55–79.
Carrera, M., Royer, H., Stehr, M., Sydnor, J., & Taubinsky, D. (2019). How are preferences
for commitment revealed? theory, evidence, and policy implications. mimeo.
Casaburi, L., & Willis, J. (2018). Time versus state in insurance: Experimental evidence
from contract farming in kenya. American Economic Review , 108 (2), 3778–3813.
Chiappori, P.-A. (1988). Rational household labor supply. Econometrica, 56 , 63–90.
Cubitt, R. P., & Read, D. (2007). Can intertemporal choice experiments elicit preferences
for consumption? Experimental Economics, 10 (4), 369––389.
DellaVigna, S., & Malmendier, U. (2006). Paying not to go to the gym. American Economic
Review , 96 , 694—719.
Dupas, P., & Robinson, J. (2013). Why don’t the poor save more? evidence from health
savings experiments. American Economic Review , 103 (4), 1138—1171.
Exley, C. (2015). Excusing selfishness in charitable giving: The role of risk. Review of
Economics Studies, 83 (2), 587-628.
Fark, A., & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic
Behavior , 54 (2), 293-315.
Gine, X., Goldberg, J., Silverman, D., & Yang, D. (2016). Revising commitments: Field
evidence on the adjustment of prior choice. The Economic Journal , 128 (February),
159–188.
Glennerster, R., & Kremer, M. (2012). Improving health in developing countries: Evidence
from randomized evaluations. In Handbook of health economics (chap. 2).
Holden, S. T., & Quiggin, J. (2017). Climate risk and state-contingent technology adoption:
shocks, drought tolerance and preferences. European Review of Agricultural Economics,
44 (2), 285–308.
Jackson, M. O., & Yariv, L. (2015). Collective dynamic choice: The necessity of time
inconsistency. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7 (4), 150—-178.
Kaur, S., Kremer, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2015). Self-control at work. Journal of Political
Economy , 123 (6), 1227–1277.
Kling, J. R., Liebman, J. B., & Katz, L. F. (2007). Experimental analysis of neighborhood
effects. Econometrica, 75 (1), 83—119.
Koelle, M., & Wozny, L. P. (2018). Present-biased generosity: Time inconsistency across
individual and social contexts. CeDEx Discussion Paper Series, 2018-02 .
40
Krawczyk, M., & Wozny, L. P. (2017). An experiment on temptation and attitude towards
paternalism. mimeo.
Kremer, M., & Holla, A. (2009). Improving education in the developing world: What have
we learned from randomized evaluations? Annual Review of Economics, One, 513–542.
Laibson, D. (2015). Why don’t present-biased agents make commitments? American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 105 (5), 267–272.
Loewenstein, G. (2018). Self-control and its discontents. a commentary on “beyond
willpower: Strategies for reducing failures of self-control” by angela duckworth, david
laibson and katie milkman. Psychological Science in the Public Interest , 19 (3), 95–101.
Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (2003). Projection bias in predicting future
utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (4), 1209–1248.
McClure, S., Laibson, D., Loewenstein, G., & Cohen, J. (2007). Time discounting for
primary rewards. Journal of Neuroscience, 27 (21), 5796––5804.
Mullainathan, S., & Shafir, E. (2013). Scarcity: Why having too little means so much.
New York, NY: Time Books, Henry Holt and Company LLC.
O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M. (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review ,
89 (1), 103–124.
Ringdal, C., & Sjursen, I. H. (2017). Household bargaining and spending on children:
Experimental evidence from tanzania. WIDER Working Paper , 2017/128 .
Schilbach, F. (2019). Alcohol and self-control: A field experiment in india. American
Economic Review , 109 (4), 1290–1322.
Shapiro, J. (2010). Discounting for you, me and we: Time preference in groups and pairs.
mimeo.
Solnick, C. H. K. D. A. E., Jay V., & Waller, M. B. (1980). An experimental analysis of
impulsivity and impulse control in humans. Experimental Economics, 11 , 61—77.
Tarozzi, A., & Mahajan, A. (2011). Time inconsistency, expectations and technology
adoption: The case of insecticide treated nets. ERID Working Paper , No. 105 .
Thakral, N., & To, L. (2020). Anticipation and consumption (Tech. Rep.). Brown Univer-
sity.
Thaler, R. H. (1999). Mental accounting matters. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making ,
12 (3), 183—206.
Toussaert, S. (2018). Eliciting temptation and self-control through menu choices: A lab
experiment. Econometrica, 86 (3), 859–889.
41
Ubfal, D. (2016). How general are time preferences? eliciting good-specific discount rates.
Journal of Development Economics, 118 , 150-170.
Uhl, M. (2011). Do self-committers mind commitment by others? an experiment on weak
paternalism. Rationality, Markets and Morals, 2 , 13–34.
Woodford, M. (2020). Modeling imprecision in perception, valuation, and choice. Annual




Figure A.1: Optimal levels of investments in children
Notes: Optimal investment as a function of θ, derived from the model presented in Section 2.2 with
the second consumption period taking place 30 days after the investment decision, and the following
parameters: α = 0.9, γ = 1.73, R = 1.05, y = 6.55 and δ = 0.99, chosen such that the optimal investment
of a symmetric parent is equal to 1. As in Section 2.2, the naive agent believes that θ̂ = θ, and the
sophisticated agent, that θ̂ = 1.
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Figure A.2: Share of peanuts allocated to the child
Follow-up data collection, t = 1 decision
(a) Only integer allocations (b) Half-integer increments allowed
Notes: Distribution of parents’ allocation decisions at round 1 in the follow-up wave of data collection. On Panel
(a), parents were only allowed to change allocations by integer increments; on Panel (b), parents were allowed to
change allocations by half-package increments.
Figure A.3: Welfare calibration
Notes: Income that a symmetric agent would require to obtain the same long-run utility as naive and so-
phisticated AGD agents with income y = 1 and asymmetric geometric discounting parameter θ, computed
from the model in Section 2.2 with the second consumption period taking place 365 days after the invest-
ment decision, and the following parameters, given by the median values in our sample calibrated from
parents’ allocation decisions in the experiment (see Appendix E): α = 0.9058, γ = 1.73, and δ = 0.9939.
As in Section 2.2, the naive agent believes that θ̂ = θ, and the sophisticated agent, that θ̂ = 1. The red
vertical line marks the median value of θ among AGD parents in our sample. We use 1 + r = 1.000589 to
match Malawi’s 24% real yearly interest rate in 2018.a
aSource: World Bank; see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FR.INR.RINR?locations=MW.
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B Additional tables
Table B.1: Summary statistics and balance across treatment arms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Framing experiment Panel B: Commitment prices
Control Labeling Anchoring p-value 0.5 1 1.5 p-value
Mother 0.924 0.901 0.894 0.16 0.903 0.916 0.913 0.73
(0.265) (0.299) (0.308) (0.296) (0.277) (0.282)
Islam 0.191 0.168 0.136 0.05 0.165 0.185 0.165 0.62
(0.393) (0.374) (0.343) (0.372) (0.388) (0.372)
Number of children 2.193 2.163 2.281 0.21 2.268 2.139 2.216 0.12
(0.992) (0.979) (1.076) (1.043) (0.983) (1.005)
Credit constraint, round 1 3.626 3.367 3.037 0.18 3.703 3.358 3.212 0.29
(5.711) (5.318) (4.211) (5.897) (5.260) (4.685)
Female child 0.531 0.521 0.514 0.84 0.567 0.503 0.506 0.06
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.496) (0.500) (0.500)
Child age 7.034 7.202 7.030 0.59 7.052 7.173 7.007 0.62
(2.891) (2.966) (2.803) (2.879) (2.954) (2.836)
Spending on preventative healthcare, USD 0.195 0.168 0.289 0.38 0.249 0.180 0.209 0.70
(1.088) (0.977) (1.899) (1.111) (1.045) (1.657)
Index of investments in health -0.022 0.003 0.013 0.28 0.006 -0.014 -0.012 0.63
(0.378) (0.404) (0.370) (0.408) (0.362) (0.378)
Index of investments in education -0.041 0.035 -0.033 0.27 0.002 -0.002 -0.056 0.38
(0.661) (0.990) (0.562) (0.934) (0.654) (0.593)
s02 0.486 0.482 0.484 0.90 0.486 0.486 0.482 0.76
(0.112) (0.121) (0.118) (0.116) (0.120) (0.112)
Observations 817 405 405 515 525 587
F-test (p-value) 0.118 0.475
Notes: Columns (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) report the mean in each treatment group of each of the variables listed.
P-values in columns (4) and (8) are from an ANOVA test of equality of means for each variable across
treatment groups. In the last row, we report p-values of F-tests from multinomial logistic regression,
with a categorical variable containing treatment assignment as dependent variable. Standard errors in
parentheses.
45
Table B.2: Robustness to correlation between AGD preferences and other preference features




1{θ̂ < 1} -0.137*** -0.139*** 0.00519 0.00613
(0.0118) (0.0118) (0.00434) (0.00455)








Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean 0.0186 0.0186 0.0235 0.0235
N 795 795 795 795
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) estimate whether AGD preferences still predict parent-biased reversals when
controlling flexibly for other preference features, proxied by the round-1 consumption share set to children
two days ahead. Columns (3) and (4) test directly whether AGD parents have a weaker preference for
peanuts by estimating whether AGD preferences predict the variance of round-3 allocations (since more
prevalent indifferences would induce higher variance). In columns (1) and (2), the outcome variable is the
change in the child’s planned consumption share at t = 3 between decision rounds; in columns (3) and
(4), it is that variable squared (a measure of round-3 allocations’ variance). Columns (4) also controls
for the round-1 consumption share set to children two days ahead. Across all columns, the sample is
restricted to the control group of the framing experiment. Control variables include the gender and age of
the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, the number of children
in the household, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which
the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.3: Robustness to dropping households with multiple children
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s2j 1{s030 > s230} sk30
j − 2 -0.000685* 1{k = 2} 0.0397***
(0.000386) (0.0104)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.452*** -0.0114 1{θ̂ < 1} 0.300*** 0.189***
(0.0663) (0.0160) (0.0624) (0.0145)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.00379*** 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.0963***
×(j − 2) (0.000761) ×1{k = 2} (0.0201)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.594 0.542 0.362 0.614
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.136 0.507 0.075 0.479
N 215 430 215 436
Sample Control and only child’s households
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of AGD on allocation decisions by restricting the sample
to children without siblings. Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to
children increase with time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s
prediction #2 that AGD parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30)
decreases when the decision is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In column (1), the
outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0
otherwise. In column (2), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child
at t = j for decisions made in round-2 (k = 2); participants’ allocations for each consumption horizon
j are stacked for the analysis. In column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set a lower
consumption share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2 relative
to when it was made at t = 0. In column (4), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts allocated to
the child at t = 30 when the decision is made at t = k; ; participants’ allocations for each decision round
k are stacked for the analysis. Across all columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the
framing experiment. In addition, the sample is further restricted to households where there is only one
child. Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a
measure of credit constraints, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the
order in which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors
clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.4: Robustness to dropping subjects who switch from AGD to symmetric (or the other way
around) between waves
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s2j 1{s030 > s230} sk30
j − 2 0.0000356 1{k = 2} 0.0532***
(0.000221) (0.00646)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.533*** -0.0397** 1{θ̂ < 1} 0.198*** 0.195***
(0.0551) (0.0156) (0.0368) (0.0132)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.00443*** 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.111***
×(j − 2) (0.000631) ×1{k = 2} (0.0193)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 457 914 457 922
Respondents 457 457 457 465
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of AGD on allocation decisions by restricting the sample
to participants who either (1) set time-increasing consumption shares to children at round 1 in both the
baseline and the follow-up waves; or (2) do not set time-increasing consumption shares to children at round
1 in either the baseline or the follow-up waves. Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’
allocations set to children increase with time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel
B tests model’s prediction #2 that AGD parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last
round (t = 30) decreases when the decision is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In
column (1), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at
round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (2), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts set to be consumed
by the child at t = j for decisions made in round-2 (k = 2); participants’ allocations for each consumption
horizon j are stacked for the analysis. In column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set a lower
consumption share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2 relative to
when it was made at t = 0. In column (4), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts allocated to the
child at t = 30 when the decision is made at t = k; ; participants’ allocations for each decision round k are
stacked for the analysis. Across all columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing
experiment. In addition, the sample is further restricted to respondents whom where classified as AGD or
not in the same way in the original survey and in the six-month follow-up survey in the task where parents
were allowed to split peanuts equally. Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the
gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, the number of children in the household, an
indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which the inter-temporal
and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.5: AGD preferences and real-life investments in children
(1) (2)
Index of investments, 3-5 years old Index of investments, 6-12 years old
1(θ̂ < 1) 0.0261 5.7702 0.0132 7.5130***
(0.0309) (4.3139) (0.0213) (2.8821)




1(β̂ < 1) 0.0023 2.2392 0.0020 1.7086
(0.0285) (3.3076) (0.0201) (2.4799)
δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) -2.2611 -1.7256
(3.3451) (2.5061)
Control variables No No No No
N 851 851 1,485 1,485
1(θ̂ < 1)=1(β̂ < 1) (p-value) 0.5749 0.5444 0.7004 0.1457
δ̂ × 1(θ̂ < 1)=δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) (p-value) 0.5486 0.1473
Correlation with education 0.0443 0.0650
Notes: Across all columns, the outcome variable is a summary index variable of investments in children,
whose components are described in Appendix C.2; each component is normalized with respect to its mean
and standard deviation among symmetric parents. Columns (1) and (2) restrict attention to investments in
children 5 years old and younger; columns (3) and (4), to investments in children 6 years old and older. δ̂ is
the discount factor each parent attaches to their child’s future utility of consumption, calibrated from their
allocation decisions in the experiment (see Appendix E). As a benchmark, we also report the correlation
coefficient of each index with participants’ education level, restricting the sample to caregivers who have no
education or attended primary school only (87% of the sample). We do not include other controls because
present-bias correlates with some household and individual characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table B.6: Effects of framing children’s consumption on parent-bias
(1) (2)
∆s30 ∆s30
Labeling 0.0111 Anchoring 0.00202
(0.0107) (0.0143)
1{θ̂ < 1} -0.117*** -0.130***
(0.0115) (0.0150)
Labeling -0.0123 Anchoring -0.0118
×1{θ̂ < 1} (0.0188) ×1{θ̂ < 1} (0.0256)
Control variables Yes Yes
Mean ∆s13 in Control group for 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.062 -0.062
N 1194 796
Sample Labeling × Control Labeling × Anchoring
Notes: Across all columns, the outcome variable is the change in the child’s planned consumption share at
t = 3 between decision rounds. Column (1) estimates the effect of labeling relative to the control group,
and column (2), the effect of anchoring relative to that of labeling. Labeling equals 1 if, at the beginning of
round 2, the starting point for participant’s allocation decision is their round-1 allocation, and 0 otherwise.
Anchoring equals 1 if, at the beginning of round 2, the starting point for participant’s allocation decision
a random allocation, and 0 otherwise. In the control group, participants start from empty plates. Control
variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of
credit constraints, the number of children in the household, an indicator variable of whether the household
is Muslim or not, and the order in which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the
respondent. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, ***
p < .01
Table B.7: AGD preferences and demand for commitment outside the lab
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own child Other child
Intends to commit WTP Intends to commit WTP
1{θ̂ < 1} -0.0540*** -56.5797*** -0.0017 -18.26
(0.0181) (20.6995) (0.0246) (23.8691)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.803 204.34 0.611 242.33
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.855 249.31 0.623 266.84
N 2169 834 2171 600
Notes: In columns (1) and (3), the outcome variable equals to 1 if the parent decided to commit lottery
proceedings to tutoring for their child, and 0 otherwise. In columns (2) and (4), the outcome variable is
parents’ willingness to pay for commitment. Columns (2) and (4) restrict attention to the sub-sample of
participants who express interest in commitment, who do not express willingness to pay for both flexibility
and commitment, and for whom there is at least one non-negative price at which they choose to commit.
Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of
credit constraints, the number of children in the household, an indicator variable of whether the household is
Muslim or not, the order in which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent,
and the level of education of the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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C [Online Appendix] Additional details on the experiment
This Appendix compiles additional details on the experiment we use to document AGD
preferences and parent-bias. Section C.1 showcases the visual aids enumerators used to
explain allocation decisions and implementation rules to the participants. Section C.2
provides a complete account of the components of the indices of real-life investments in
children that we use in the main paper. Section C.3 helps the reader navigate through the
two pre-analysis plans that were pre-registered for this study, and summarizes deviations
from pre-registration.
C.1 Visual aids to study participants
In each round of the experiment, subjects were presented with two scenarios (random
ordering). In the inter-temporal scenario, which is visually displayed in Figure C.1, subjects
had to split the consumption of 3 packages of peanuts for their own consumption between
t = 2 and t = 3. For each package not consumed at t = 2, the respondent receives r
additional packages at t = 3, r ∈ 0.5, 1, 1.5. In the main scenario, subjects had to split the
consumption of 5 packages of peanuts between themselves and their child in each period,
for t = 2 and t = 3. Similar visuals to Figure C.1 were used by enumerators to illustrate
and help participants make decisions.
By the end of round 2, the allocation actually implemented is randomly drawn from
the plans set at rounds 1 and 2. Respondents had the possibility to sign up to a costly
commitment which would affect the probability that round 1-decisions were implemented.
Concretely, such probabilistic commitment decreased the likelihood that the t = 2 allo-
cation would be implemented over the t = 1 allocation, from 90% to 10%. Figure C.2
was used by enumerators to explain how commitment worked and help participants make
decisions.
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Figure C.1: Sample visual aid for inter-temporal scenario (round 1, r = 0.5)
Notes: Visual aid presented to participants in the inter-temporal scenario, when making the choice for
r = 0.5 at round 1. Similar visuals were presented to illustrate feasible allocations at round 2, and under
different interest rates.
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Figure C.2: Visual aid for probabilistic commitment device (P = 1)
Notes: Visual aid presented to participants to illustrate the effects of the probabilistic commitment device
at round 1. The upper panel showcases that, without commitment, decisions undertaken at round 1
(‘today’) only had a 1 in 10 chance of being implemented at the end of round 2. The lower panel showcases
that, with commitment, that chance would increase to 9 in 10. The figure showed the cost of commitment
(0.5, 1 or 1.5 packages of peanuts, billed from the parent’s consumption at round 3).
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C.2 Components of the real-life investments’ indices
This subsection describes the components of the summary indices of real-life investments
in children that we pre-registered. For children 3-5 years old, the index is composed of the
following investments:
1. Mean expenses on preventative health-care in the 4 weeks before the experiment;
2. Immunization against measles and rubella;
3. Multiple Micronutrient powder in the 7 days before the experiment;
4. Iron supplements in the 7 days before the experiment;
5. Therapeutic food in the 7 days before the experiment;
6. Supplementary food in the 7 days before the experiment;
7. Vitamin A dose in the 3 months before the experiment;
8. Drug for intestinal worms in the 6 months before the experiment;
9. Growth check-up at under-5 clinic the 3 months before the experiment;
10. Health check-up at under-5 clinic in the 3 months before the experiment;
11. Number of days spent in an Early Childhood Development Program in the 7 days
before the experiment; and
12. Expenses to send the child to the ECDP.
For children older 6-12 years old, the index is composed of the following investments:
1. Number of days the child attended school in the month before the experiment;
2. School expenditures; and
3. Education support score.
Following Kling et al. (2007), we form summary indices by standardizing each compo-
nent (normalizing by their mean and standard deviation among symmetric parents) and
then averaging across them.
C.3 Pre-analysis plans
The experimental design and analysis plan linked to the baseline wave, conducted be-
tween November 2018 and January 2019, were pre-registered at the AEA RCT Registry
on November 06, 2018, before the start of data collection (AEARCTR-0003535).44 In
44See https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3535.
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this Appendix, we refer to that pre-analysis plan as PaP 1. We pre-registered a sec-
ond pre-analysis plan before the follow-up wave, conducted between June and Septem-
ber 2019, registered at the AEA RCT registry under AEARCTR-0004386.See https://
www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/4386. In this Appendix, we refer to that pre-
analysis plan as PaP 2.
To increase transparency and help the reader navigate through the extensive pre-
analysis plans, this section summarizes the outcomes and analyses pre-specified for each
section of the paper, and justify deviations from pre-registration.
C.3.1 A model of parental investments in children in Section 2
• Consumption case: Registered in Section 2, PaP 1. Different from the PaP, the
model in the main text abstracts from the possibility that parents’ preferences might
be characterized by (asymmetric) quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We extend the model
to allow for such preferences in Appendix G.4.2. We also simplified the notation and
introduced the coefficient of asymmetric geometric discounting, θ, such that δa = θδ
and δc = δ.
• Investment case: We added that section after pre-registration, to study inter-temporal
trade-offs and sophistication affected AGD parents’ investments in children, and to
compute welfare consequences of AGD preferences.
C.3.2 Empirical strategy in Section 3
• Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 were registered in section 4.1, PaP 1. Details of the sample
selection were registered in section 3, PaP 1. Allowing for half-package increments
was registered in PaP 2. In the baseline wave, we ended up recruiting more households
to become part of the experiment than we had originally planned (2,413 instead of
2,400). We could not always recruit 30 households per village, so the total number
of households per village was slightly higher or lower. We had aimed to include
15% of male respondents in our sample. However, our final sample only contains
8% of men, as fathers were often away from home during the day. In addition, we
excluded from the analyses in the main text parents who had been allocated to the
child participation (chosen) or (imposed) treatment arms – for the reasons explained
in detail below –, both pre-registered at PaP 1, reducing our main sample to 1,627
households.
Terminology: We introduced the concept of asymmetric geometric discounting based
on the round-1 decisions after pre-registration. PaP 1 only defined parent-bias as
reallocations away from the child’s consumption (section 2.1 of PaP 1). In addition,
what we referred to as "within-household present-bias" in PaP 1 has become "asym-
metric quasi-hyperbolic discounting" or "asymmetric present-bias" in the paper.
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• Subsection 3.3 was registered in section 5, PaP 1. Different from pre-registration,
we did not conduct a household census before the first day of data collection, due
to budget constraints. Instead, enumerators used a random-walking sampling pro-
cedure. Households were randomly assigned to different treatment arms through a
table-based randomization procedure on the spot. For this reason, the number of
households in each treatment arm may differ slightly from the target number pre-
registered. We offered a subset of participants the possibility to have their child
present at the time of their round-2 decision. We introduced this alternative, real-
life commitment strategy, as we were interested in whether that could be used as a
realistic device for parents to tie their own hands. We also randomly assigned an-
other subset of parents to have their child participate at round 2 (mandated, not by
choice), to document the causal effect of child participation on round-1 and round-2
allocations. While we pre-registered that we would analyze those treatment effects
in the context of interventions to mitigate parent-bias (5.1.2 and 5.2.4. in PAP 1),
it turns out that including children as part of the decision problem yield ambigu-
ous theoretical predictions when it comes to its effects on allocation trajectories (see
Appendix D.2). For this reason, we exclude those sub-samples from the analyses
of the main paper, and compile all empirical results linked to child participation in
Appendix G.8.
• Subsection 3.4: Investments and demand for commitment outside the lab were reg-
istered in section 6.1. of PaP 1 and 3.3.1. of PaP 2. Different from pre-registration,
we study whether AGD parents have a higher willingness to pay to open a savings
account under their child’s name in a local bank separately from parent’s willingness
to pay for commitment in the context of tutoring to their child. The reason is that
the former is actually closer to labeling, as there are no constraints in Malawi to
prevent legal guardians from withdrawing cash from their child’s account before they
turn 18. As such, we restrict attention to tutoring in the main text, and compile our
analyses of parents’ demand for the savings account in Appendix G.7.
C.3.3 New stylized facts about parents’ dynamic allocations in Section 4
It presents stylized facts that match hypotheses 1a and 2a of section 6 in PaP 1.
C.3.4 Testing the model’s predictions in Section 5
• The regression analyses in this section were not pre-registered. The analyses specified
in PaP 1 only tested whether study participants were AGD on average. Instead, the
analyses in paper pin down the relationship between AGD preferences (defined in
round 1) and dynamic allocation decisions (in round 2).
• 5.3 Robustness checks: Subsection 5.3.3 (Asymmetric present-bias) corresponds to
the hypothesis 2b of PaP 1. Robustness checks described in subsections 5.3.1-5.3.2
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and 5.3.4-5.3.7 were not pre-registered. Those analyses help rule out alternative
explanations for parent-bias that were not anticipated at the time of pre-registration.
• 5.4. Welfare consequences and the calibration procedure that feeds this analysis were
not pre-specified.
• 5.5. Investments in children outside the lab: the analysis was pre-specified in section
6.1. of PaP 1. We pre-registered the comparison between the average levels of
investments in children among parent-biased and non-parent biased respondents.
After pre-registration, besides specializing the comparison to AGD vs. symmetric
parents, we decided to add interactions of AGD preferences with parents’ discount
rate of their children’s future utility of consumption, δ̂. The reason is that, while
there is only one way to be present-biased (β < 1), there are multiple ways to be
parent-biased: without holding δ constant, there is no constraint on the extent to
which an AGD parent is more or less patient than a symmetric parent with respect
to their own or their children’s future consumption.
C.3.5 Testing interventions to mitigate parent-bias in Section 6
• 6.1. Balance and selective attrition tests were pre-registered in section 7 of PaP 1.
• 6.2. Framing consumption decisions: corresponds to hypothesis 6 in PaP 1. We
included more control variables relative to pre-registration to add precision. We also
separately analyzed the effects of the Labeling and Anchoring treatments for AGD
parents.
• 6.3. Commitment to future plans: Our strategy to measure sophistication was de-
scribed in section 5.3.1 of PaP 1. Demand for commitment in the lab corresponds
to hypotheses 3 in PaP 1. Demand for commitment outside the lab corresponds to
section 3.3.1 of PaP 2. Last, the subsection AGD preferences vs. time-increasing
altruism refers to section 3.3.2 of PaP 2.
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D [Online Appendix] Proofs and model extensions
Section D.1 presents the proof of Proposition 2 in the main text. Section D.2 extends the
consumption model to allow the child to influence the decision process.
D.1 Proof of Proposition 2
For this proof, we assume that the instantaneous utility of consumption of both the parent
and the child exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) γ:
v(c) = u(c) =
 11−γ c1−γ , if γ 6= 1ln(c), otherwise (D.1)
The parent anticipates that her optimal allocation at t = 2 will be:

































))1−γ . Plugging the anticipated values of z2 and x2
















That with respect to I yields: (y − I∗ − z∗1)−γ = (θδBR+ αδCR)(y + I∗R)−γ
⇔ y − I∗ − z∗1 = (θδBR+ αδCR)
− 1





























































Hence, parents’ optimal investment at t = 1 depends on the parent’s degree of sophistica-
tion (given by θ̂).

























































































































































Since θ̂ ∈ [θ, 1], ∂X
∂θ̂
≥ 0 if γ > 1 , and < 0 otherwise.








≥ 0 if γ > 1 , and < 0 otherwise. 
D.2 Modeling child participation
This Appendix extends the consumption model from Section 2.1 to allow for child partici-
pation in the household’s dynamic allocation decisions. Let ∆ and Θ∆ be the discounting
factors that the child uses towards her own and her parent’s future utility of consumption,
respectively, with Θ ≤ 1, and let A be the child’s coefficient of imperfect altruism towards
her parent. For simplicity (and consistent with our experimental design; see Appendix
G.8), we focus on child participation at t = 2. Formally, the child’s objective function at










s.t.x22 + z22 ≤ yx23 + z23 ≤ y
We set the child’s bargaining power at t = 2 to γ ∈ [0, 1], and that of her parent, to 1−γ.
Following Chiappori (1988), the within-household bargain at t = 2 can be represented by

























s.t.x22 + z22 ≤ yx23 + z23 ≤ y
In this Appendix, we further assume α < 1 and A < 1 to ensure stationarity of the
child’s and parent’s best-response functions. Having the child take part in the household




α(1− γ) + γ






(1− γ)αδ + γ∆
(1− γ) (θδ) + γA (Θ∆)
The derivative of u
′(x22)
v′(z22)
with respect to γ simplifies to 1−Aα
(Aγ−γ+1)2 , which is always
positive. Increasing the child’s bargaining power at t = 2 increases her current consumption
share, for all parents.




((1−γ)(θδ)+γA(Θ∆))2 . For symmetric parents (θ = 1),
θ > AαΘ. As such, increasing the child’s bargaining power necessarily increases her future
consumption. In turn, for AGD parents, the sign of that derivative is ambiguous: it
depends on the ratio of parent’s and child’s asymmetric geometric discount factors, θΘ .
If that ratio is low enough (what happens, for instance, if AGD parents are much more
patient about their children’s future utility of consumption than about their own), then
child participation might even exacerbate parent-bias – instead of mitigating it.
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E [Online Appendix] Calibrating preference parameters
This Appendix provides all details on how we calibrate preference parameters based on
parents’ allocation decisions in the experiment. As described in Section 3.1, we elicit par-
ents’ decisions under two experimental scenarios: the main scenario, whereby respondents
decide how to split peanuts between themselves and their children at different planning
horizons; and the inter-temporal scenario, whereby participants decide how to split peanuts
for themselves over time, under different interest rates. We use first-order conditions from
parents’ dynamic optimization problems in both scenarios to derive analytical formulas
and estimate preference parameters for each study participant, for the case of CRRA pref-
erences with parameter γ = 1.73 (following Holden & Quiggin, 2017, for Malawi). We base
all derivations on the consumption model from Section 2.1, extended for the possibility
that preferences might also display quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
E.1 Estimating α̂
We estimate α̂ from first-order conditions in the main experimental scenario, at round 2.








s.t.x22 + z22 ≤ yx23 + z23 ≤ y








. Figure E.1 shows the
distribution of α̂. Its median value is 1.1039 among symmetric parents, and 0.9058 among
AGD parents.
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Figure E.1: Distribution of α̂
E.2 Estimating θ̂
We estimate θ̂ from first-order conditions in the main experimental scenario, at round 1.







s.t.x12 + z12 ≤ yx13 + z13 ≤ y










Figure E.2 shows the distribution of θ̂ . Its median value is equal to 1 among symmetric
parents, and 0.9930 among AGD parents.
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Figure E.2: Distribution of θ̂
E.3 Estimating β̂a and β̂c
We allow parents to display (asymmetric) quasi-hyperbolic discounting, estimating β̂a (the
extent of present-bias towards parents’ own future utility of consumption) in the inter-
temporal scenario, and then using this estimate to infer β̂c (the extent of present-bias
towards children’s future utility of consumption).
E.3.1 Estimating β̂a







s.t.x12 + s2 ≤ yx13 ≤ (1 + r)s2
FOCs yield:
u′(x12) = (δθ)
28(1 + r)u′(x13) (E.2)
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s.t.x22 + s2 ≤ yx23 ≤ (1 + r)s2
FOCs yield:
u′(x22) = βa(δθ)
28(1 + r)u′(x23) (E.3)











(1 + r)(y − x22,i)




We estimate β̂a,i(r) for each interest rate r ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5}. The three resulting estimates
exhibit significantly positive pairwise correlation(p<0.001). We average across the three
estimates to obtain β̂a,i. Figure E.3 shows the distribution of β̂a. Its median is 1 for both
symmetric and AGD parents.
E.3.2 Estimating β̂c







































And the FOCs yield: u
′(x22)
v′(z22)























estimates exhibit significantly positive pairwise correlation(p<0.001). We average across
the three estimates to obtain β̂c,i
β̂a,i
. We obtain β̂c,i by multiplying the latter by β̂a,i . Figure
E.4 shows the distribution of β̂c. Its median is 0.9925 for symmetric parents, and 0.9306
for AGD parents.
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Figure E.3: Distribution of β̂a
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Figure E.4: Distribution of β̂c
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E.4 Estimation of δ̂
We start by estimating δ̂θ̂, using first-order conditions from the inter-temporal scenario.
δ̂θ̂ can be inferred from either round-1 or round-2 decisions, as a function of interest rates.






s.t.x12 + s2 ≤ yx13 ≤ (1 + r)s2







































(r) for interest rates r ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5}. The three estimates exhibit













x22 + s2 ≤ y2
x23 ≤ (1 + r)s2
y2 = y




































(r) for interest rates r ∈ {0.5, 1, 1.5}. The three
estimates exhibit significantly positive pairwise correlation (p < 0.0001). We then average















are significantly correlated (p<0.001). We then average those to obtain δ̂iθ̂i.
Last, δ̂i results from dividing δ̂iθ̂i by θ̂i. Figure E.5 shows the distribution of δ̂. Its
median is 0.9887 for symmetric parents, and 0.9939 for AGD parents.
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Figure E.5: Distribution of δ̂
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F [Online Appendix] Heterogeneity
Table F.1 documents that AGD preferences are not predicted by household or individual
characteristics that we observe, neither at the baseline or at the follow-up wave. Next,
we estimate heterogeneous effects of AGD preferences on parents’ dynamic allocations
(subsection F.1) and real-life investments in children (subsection F.2) by children’s gender,
age and birth order. These tests show that the effects of AGD preferences do not vary
systematically with the child’s characteristics, although some large differences suggest that
we have limited statistical power to precisely detect them.







Birth order 0.023 -0.009
(0.028) (0.015)
Number of children in household 0.010 0.002
(0.012) (0.018)










Notes: This table estimates whether AGD preferences are predicted by household or individual character-
istics. In column (1), the outcome variable is an indicator of AGD preferences determined in the baseline
experiment. The sample in this column is restricted to the respondents assigned to the control group in the
baseline experiment. In column (2), the outcome variable is an indicator of AGD preferences determined
in the follow-up data collection. This column excludes from the follow-up sample the respondents who
were not part of the main sample at baseline. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
F.1 Heterogeneous effects on dynamic allocation decisions
In each table, Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to
children increase with the time gap between decisions and consumption; and Panel B tests
model’s prediction #2 that AGD parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at
the last round (t = 30) is revised downwards as consumption gets closer (although still
in the future). Table F.2 estimates heterogeneous effects by the child’s gender. Table
F.3 estimates heterogeneous effects by the child’s birth order, interacting the indicator of
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AGD preferences with an indicator of whether the child is firstborn. Table F.4 estimates
heterogeneous effects by the child’s age, interacting the indicator of AGD preferences with
an indicator of whether the child is above or below the sample median age (8 years old).
Last, Table F.5 estimates heterogeneous effects by the child’s gender and birth order.
Table F.2: Testing the model’s predictions: Heterogeneity by the child’s gender
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s230 − s22 1{s030 > s230} s230 − s030
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.373*** 0.0735*** 0.267*** -0.124***
(0.0520) (0.0170) (0.0462) (0.0158)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0569 0.0249 0.00492 0.0133
×Trait = Girl (0.0715) (0.0227) (0.0640) (0.0228)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.087 0.328 -0.062
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.001 0.063 0.053
N 795 795 795 795
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to children increase with
time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s prediction #2 that AGD
parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30) decreases when the decision
is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In each column, we interact the indicator of AGD
preferences with an indicator of the child’s gender. In column (1), the outcome variable equals 1 if the
parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (2), the
outcome variable is the difference between the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child at t = 30
and t = 2 for decisions made in round-2. In column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set
a lower consumption share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2
relative to when it was made at t = 0. In column (4), the outcome variable is the difference between the
decision made at t = 2 and t = 0 for the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30. Across all
columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing experiment. Control variables include
the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints,
the number of children in the household, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not,
and the order in which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table F.3: Testing the model’s predictions: Heterogeneity by the child’s birth order
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s230 − s22 1{s030 > s230} s230 − s030
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.393*** 0.0829*** 0.258*** -0.124***
(0.0435) (0.0133) (0.0386) (0.0142)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0323 0.0124 0.0321 0.0227
×Trait = First born (0.0771) (0.0259) (0.0706) (0.0249)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.087 0.328 -0.062
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.001 0.063 0.053
N 795 795 795 795
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to children increase with
time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s prediction #2 that AGD
parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30) decreases when the decision
is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In each column, we interact the indicator of AGD
preferences with an indicator of whether the child is firstborn. In column (1), the outcome variable equals
1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (2),
the outcome variable is the difference between the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child at
t = 30 and t = 2 for decisions made in round-2. In column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent
set a lower consumption share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2
relative to when it was made at t = 0. In column (4), the outcome variable is the difference between the
decision made at t = 2 and t = 0 for the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30. Across all
columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing experiment. Control variables include
the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints,
the number of children in the household, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not,
and the order in which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table F.4: Testing the model’s predictions: Heterogeneity by the child’s age
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s230 − s22 1{s030 > s230} s230 − s030
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.386*** 0.0853*** 0.270*** -0.117***
(0.0459) (0.0146) (0.0400) (0.0150)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0352 0.00160 0.00291 -0.00152
×Trait = Over 8 years old (0.0737) (0.0232) (0.0668) (0.0233)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.087 0.328 -0.062
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.001 0.063 0.053
N 795 795 795 795
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to children increase with
time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s prediction #2 that AGD
parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30) decreases when the decision
is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In each column, we interact the indicator of AGD
preferences with an indicator of whether the child is above or below the sample median age (8 years old).
In column (1), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child
at round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (2), the outcome variable is the difference between the share of
peanuts set to be consumed by the child at t = 30 and t = 2 for decisions made in round-2. In column
(3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set a lower consumption share to be consumed by her
child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2 relative to when it was made at t = 0. In column
(4), the outcome variable is the difference between the decision made at t = 2 and t = 0 for the share
of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30. Across all columns, the sample is restricted to the control
group of the framing experiment. Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the
gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, the number of children in the household, an
indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which the inter-temporal
and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table F.5: Testing the model’s predictions: Heterogeneity by the child’s birth order and gender
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s230 − s22 1{s030 > s230} s230 − s030
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.386*** 0.0723*** 0.270*** -0.126***
(0.0459) (0.0196) (0.0400) (0.0201)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0109 0.00324 0.0633 0.00703
×Trait = First born (0.114) (0.0392) (0.103) (0.0323)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0363 0.0156 -0.0594 0.0288
×Trait = First born × Girl (0.155) (0.0518) (0.143) (0.0491)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0452 0.0203 0.0192 0.00504
×Trait = Girl (0.0870) (0.0263) (0.0768) (0.0280)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.087 0.328 -0.062
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.001 0.063 0.053
N 795 795 795 795
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to children increase with
time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s prediction #2 that AGD
parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30) decreases when the decision
is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In each column, we interact the indicator of AGD
preferences with an indicator of the child’s gender, with an indicator of whether the child is firstborn or
not, and with both indicators interacted together. In column (1), the outcome variable equals 1 if the
parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (2), the
outcome variable is the difference between the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child at t = 30
and t = 2 for decisions made in round-2. In column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set
a lower consumption share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2
relative to when it was made at t = 0. In column (4), the outcome variable is the difference between the
decision made at t = 2 and t = 0 for the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30. Across all
columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing experiment. Control variables include
the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints,
the number of children in the household, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not,
and the order in which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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F.2 Real-life investments in children
Each table documents the correlation between AGD preferences and investments in chil-
dren, also estimating the latter’s correlation with present-bias as a benchmark. In each
table, column (1) restricts attention to 3-5 year-old children, and column (2), to 6-12 year-
old. Table F.6 estimates heterogeneous effects by the child’s gender. Table F.7 estimates
heterogeneous effects by the child’s birth order, splitting the sample by first-born children
and all others. We estimate seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to test for equality of
coefficients across different regressions.
Table F.6: AGD and investments in children: Heterogeneity by the child’s gender
(1) (2)
Index of investments, 3-5 years old Index of investments, 6-12 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Boys Girls Boys Girls
1(θ̂ < 1) 4.8368 8.9379 4.5465 9.8061**
(6.5396) (5.7858) (3.9616) (4.2463)
δ̂ × 1(θ̂ < 1) -4.8334 -8.9846 -4.5646 -9.8781**
(6.5810) (5.8322) (3.9937) (4.2797)
δ̂ 4.2531 1.0103 0.8702 5.5154**
(3.3926) (3.3450) (2.3090) (2.4538)
1(β̂ < 1) 3.9584 -0.3479 -1.3478 4.4773
(4.7593) (4.5811) (3.4552) (3.6027)
δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) -4.0871 0.4364 1.4092 -4.5672
(4.8119) (4.6343) (3.4926) (3.6401)
Tests of equality of coefficients for boys vs girls (p-value)
1(θ̂ < 1) 0.6711 0.3808
δ̂ × 1(θ̂ < 1) 0.6691 0.3797
1(β̂ < 1) 0.5473 0.2480
δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) 0.5317 0.2412
Control variables No No No No
N 389 462 759 726
1(θ̂ < 1)=1(β̂ < 1) (p-value) 0.9183 0.2469 0.2663 0.3805
δ̂ × 1(θ̂ < 1)=δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) (p-value) 0.9311 0.2450 0.2645 0.3867
Notes: Across all columns, the outcome variable is a summary index variable of investments in children,
whose components are described in Appendix C.2; each component is normalized with respect to its mean
and standard deviation among symmetric parents. Columns (1) and (2) restrict attention to investments
in children 5 years old and younger; columns (3) and (4), to investments in children 6 years old and older.
Columns (1) and (3) display results for the sub-sample of boys in our data, while columns (2) and (4) are
for the sub-sample of girls. δ̂ is the discount factor each parent attaches to their child’s future utility of
consumption, calibrated from their allocation decisions in the experiment (see Appendix E). We do not
include other controls because present-bias correlates with some household and individual characteristics.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table F.7: AGD and investments in children: Heterogeneity by the child’s birth order
(1) (2)
Index of investments, 3-5 years old Index of investments, 6-12 years old
6= first born = first born 6= first born = first born
1(θ̂ < 1) 5.5269 5.7170 6.6338** 8.2623
(5.4347) (7.1106) (3.3109) (6.0162)
δ̂ × 1(θ̂ < 1) -5.5695 -5.6768 -6.6916** -8.2809
(5.4757) (7.1607) (3.3358) (6.0722)
δ̂ 3.0049 2.2982 3.2724* 3.7161
(3.1400) (3.6965) (1.8548) (3.9289)
1(β̂ < 1) -0.3712 7.7877 0.4108 6.7298
(4.1922) (5.4193) (2.7974) (5.4286)
δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) 0.3517 -7.8369 -0.3976 -6.8675
(4.2401) (5.4805) (2.8266) (5.4889)
Tests of equality of coefficients for first born vs not first born (p-value)
1(θ̂ < 1) 0.9848 0.8272
δ̂ × 1(θ̂ < 1) 0.9915 0.8327
1(β̂ < 1) 0.2846 0.3202
δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) 0.2878 0.3144
Control variables No No No No
N 486 362 1,166 315
1(θ̂ < 1)=1(β̂ < 1) (p-value) 0.4127 0.8339 0.1704 0.8576
δ̂ × 1(θ̂ < 1)=δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) (p-value) 0.4153 0.8285 0.1696 0.8699
Notes: Across all columns, the outcome variable is a summary index variable of investments in children,
whose components are described in Appendix C.2; each component is normalized with respect to its mean
and standard deviation among symmetric parents. Columns (1) and (2) restrict attention to investments
in children 5 years old and younger; columns (3) and (4), to investments in children 6 years old and older.
Columns (1) and (3) display results for the sub-sample of children who are not firstborn in our data, while
columns (2) and (4) are for the sub-sample of children who are firstborn. δ̂ is the discount factor each
parent attaches to their child’s future utility of consumption, calibrated from their allocation decisions in
the experiment (see Appendix E). We do not include other controls because present-bias correlates with
some household and individual characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, ***
p < .01
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G [Online Appendix] Additional results
This Appendix compiles additional results. Section G.1 documents additional robustness
checks for our results on testing the model’s predictions and real-life investments in chil-
dren. Specifically, we show that those results are robust to clustering standard errors at
the village level to allow for spatially correlated shocks, to absorbing village fixed-effects,
and for controlling flexibly for payday effects and for the price of commitment, to rule
out identification concerns discussed in the main text. Section G.2 documents selective
attrition tests. Section G.3 documents whether parents’ decisions during the experiment
affects children’s consumption outside of the experiment. Section G.4 compiles additional
results from the inter-temporal scenario, including parents’ responses to interest rates, the
prevalence of (asymmetric) present-bias among study participants, and the joint distribu-
tion of sophistication about different biases. Section G.6 details an additional experiment
that we conducted in order to see whether AGD parents are more likely to demand some
kind of committment. In the same spirit, Section G.7 presents results of the willingness to
pay of AGD parents for another commitment device. Last, Section G.8 compiles results
on the effects of involving children in the decision-making process, and parents’ demand
for it.
G.1 Additional robustness checks
G.1.1 Dynamic allocation decisions
In each table, Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to
children increase with the time gap between decisions and consumption; and Panel B tests
model’s prediction #2 that AGD parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the
last round (t = 30) is revised downwards when as consumption gets closer (although still
in the future). We control for village fixed-effects in Table G.1, cluster standard errors
at the village level in Table G.2, and allow the slope of the allocation schedule as well as
reversals to vary with the date of the visit in Table G.3 and with the price of commitment
in Table G.4.
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Table G.1: Testing the model’s predictions: Village-level shocks
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s2j 1{s030 > s230} sk30
j − 2 0.000026 1{k = 2} 0.0534***
(0.0002) (0.0061)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.390*** -0.0197** 1{θ̂ < 1} 0.274*** 0.187***
(0.0370) (0.0086) (0.0330) (0.0081)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0031*** 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.118***
×(j − 2) (0.0004) ×1{k = 2} (0.0118)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.536 0.328 0.612
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.513 0.063 0.487
N 795 1590 795 1608
Respondents 795 795 795 813
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of AGD on allocation decisions by controlling for village
fixed effects. Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to children increase
with time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s prediction #2 that
AGD parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30) decreases when the
decision is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In column (1), the outcome variable equals
1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (2),
the outcome variable is the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child at t = j for decisions made in
round-2 (k = 2); participants’ allocations for each consumption horizon j are stacked for the analysis. In
column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set a lower consumption share to be consumed by
her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2 relative to when it was made at t = 0. In column
(4), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30 when the decision is
made at t = k; ; participants’ allocations for each decision round k are stacked for the analysis. Across all
columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing experiment. Control variables include
the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, an
indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which the inter-temporal
and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. We further control for village fixed effects. Standard
errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Table G.2: Testing the model’s predictions: Higher-level clustering
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s2j 1{s030 > s230} sk30
j − 2 0.000026 1{k = 2} 0.053***
(0.0002) (0.0055)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.403*** -0.0196*** 1{θ̂ < 1} 0.270*** 0.186***
(0.0362) (0.0074) (0.0340) (0.0076)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0031*** 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.118***
×(j − 2) (0.0004) ×1{k = 2} (0.0120)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.536 0.328 0.612
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.513 0.063 0.487
N 795 1590 795 1608
Respondents 795 795 795 813
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of AGD on allocation decisions by clustering the standard
errors at the village level. Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to
children increase with time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s
prediction #2 that AGD parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30)
decreases when the decision is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In column (1), the
outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0
otherwise. In column (2), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child at
t = j for decisions made in round-2 (k = 2); participants’ allocations for each consumption horizon j are
stacked for the analysis. In column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set a lower consumption
share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2 relative to when it was
made at t = 0. In column (4), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30
when the decision is made at t = k; ; participants’ allocations for each decision round k are stacked for
the analysis. Across all columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing experiment.
Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure
of credit constraints, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in
which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. We further control for
village fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05,
*** p < .01
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Table G.3: Testing the model’s predictions: Controlling for visit days
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1{s230 > s22} s2j 1{s030 > s230} sk30
j − 2 0.0000164 1{k = 2} 0.047***
(0.0003) (0.0086)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.403*** -0.0209** 1{θ̂ < 1} 0.270*** 0.186***
(0.0357) (0.0089) (0.0340) (0.0084)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0032*** 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.117***
×(j − 2) (0.0004) ×1{k = 2} (0.0120)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean 0.581 0.536 0.328 0.612
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.176 0.513 0.063 0.487
N 795 1508 795 1523
Respondents 795 795 795 813
Sample Control Control Control Control
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of AGD on allocation decisions by controlling for a dummy
variable indicating whether the visit by enumerators took place in the first-half (dummy=0) or second-half
(dummy=1) of the month. Panel A tests model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to
children increase with time horizon between the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s
prediction #2 that AGD parents’ allocation set to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30)
decreases when the decision is made at k = 2 relative to when it is made at k = 1. In column (1), the
outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set time-increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0
otherwise. In column (2), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child at
t = j for decisions made in round-2 (k = 2); participants’ allocations for each consumption horizon j are
stacked for the analysis. In column (3), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set a lower consumption
share to be consumed by her child at t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2 relative to when it was
made at t = 0. In column (4), the outcome variable is the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30
when the decision is made at t = k; ; participants’ allocations for each decision round k are stacked for
the analysis. Across all columns, the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing experiment.
It is also further restricted to households for which the day of the visit was correctly recorded in the data.
Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure
of credit constraints, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in
which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. We further control for a
dummy variable indicating whether the visit by enumerators took place in the first-half (dummy=0) or
second-half (dummy=1) of the month. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. *
p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
79
Table G.4: Robustness to learning about costly commitment between decision rounds
Panel A: Prediction #1 Panel B: Prediction #2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆s30 1{s230 > s22} s2j 1{s030 > s230} sk30
j − 2 0.0000257 1{k = 2} 0.053***
(0.0002) (0.0059)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.360*** -0.0198** 1{θ̂ < 1} 0.225*** 0.185***
(0.0934) (0.0087) (0.0844) (0.0081)
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.0029*** 1{θ̂ < 1} -0.130***
×(j − 2) (0.0009) ×1{k = 2} (0.0249)
Commitment price 0.0110 Commitment price -0.0404 -0.0054 Commitment price -0.0480* -0.0131
(0.0134) (0.0381) (0.0095) (0.0261) (0.0091)
1{θ̂ < 1} × Price 0.0413 1{θ̂ < 1} × Price 0.0435
(0.0845) (0.0763)
1{θ̂ < 1} × Price 0.0001 1{θ̂ < 1} × Price 0.0117
×(j − 2) (0.0008) ×1{k = 2} (0.0229)
Control No Yes Yes Yes Yes
AGD parents’ mean -0.062 0.581 0.536 0.328 0.612
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.054 0.176 0.513 0.063 0.487
N 719 795 1590 795 1608
Respondents 719 795 795 795 813
Sample Control Control Control Control Control
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of the price of commitment on: the change in the child’s
planned consumption share at t=3 between decision rounds in column (1); the model’s predictions in Panels
A and B. The price of commitment takes values 0.5, 1, and 1.5. In column (1), the outcome variable is
the change in the child’s planned consumption share at t=3 between decision rounds. Panel A tests
model’s prediction #1 that AGD parents’ allocations set to children increase with time horizon between
the decision and consumption; and Panel B tests model’s prediction #2 that AGD parents’ allocation set
to be consumed by children at the last round (t = 30) decreases when the decision is made at k = 2
relative to when it is made at k = 1. In column (2), the outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set time-
increasing budget shares to her child at round 2, and 0 otherwise. In column (3), the outcome variable
is the share of peanuts set to be consumed by the child at t = j for decisions made in round-2 (k = 2);
participants’ allocations for each consumption horizon j are stacked for the analysis. In column (4), the
outcome variable equals 1 if the parent set a lower consumption share to be consumed by her child at
t = 30 when the decision was made at t = 2 relative to when it was made at t = 0. In column (5), the
outcome variable is the share of peanuts allocated to the child at t = 30 when the decision is made at
t = k; ; participants’ allocations for each decision round k are stacked for the analysis. Across all columns,
the sample is restricted to the control group of the framing experiment. Control variables in Panels A
and B include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit
constraints, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which the
inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the
individual level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
G.1.2 Real-life investments in children
Each table documents the correlation between AGD preferences and investments in chil-
dren, also estimating the latter’s correlation with present-bias as a benchmark. In each
table, column (1) restricts attention to 3-5 year-old children, and column (2), to 6-12 year-
old. We control for village fixed-effects in Table G.5 and cluster standard errors at the
village level in Table G.6.
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Table G.5: AGD and investments in children: Village-level shocks
Index of investments, 3-5 years old Index of investments, 6-12 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(θ̂ < 1) 0.0246 2.9500 0.0142 6.9119**
(0.0315) (4.3871) (0.0213) (2.8776)




1(β̂ < 1) -0.0174 4.2145 -0.0019 2.6935
(0.0290) (3.3900) (0.0204) (2.4969)
δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) -4.2756 -2.7290
(3.4283) (2.5235)
Village fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No No No No
N 851 851 1,485 1,485
Notes: Across all columns, the outcome variable is a summary index variable of investments in children,
whose components are described in Appendix C.2; each component is normalized with respect to its mean
and standard deviation among symmetric parents. Columns (1) and (2) restrict attention to investments
in children 5 years old and younger; columns (3) and (4), to investments in children 6 years old and
older. δ̂ is the discount factor each parent attaches to their child’s future utility of consumption, calibrated
from their allocation decisions in the experiment (see Appendix E). We control for village fixed effects in
all columns. We do not include other controls because present-bias correlates with some household and
individual characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Table G.6: AGD and investments in children: Higher-level clustering
Index of investments, 3-5 years old Index of investments, 6-12 years old
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1(θ̂ < 1) 0.0261 5.7702 0.0132 7.5130**
(0.0310) (4.5665) (0.0215) (2.9872)




1(β̂ < 1) 0.0023 2.2392 0.0020 1.7086
(0.0308) (3.6830) (0.0211) (2.2512)
δ̂ × 1(β̂ < 1) -2.2611 -1.7256
(3.7237) (2.2780)
Control variables No No No No
N 851 851 1,485 1,485
Notes: Across all columns, the outcome variable is a summary index variable of investments in children,
whose components are described in Appendix C.2; each component is normalized with respect to its mean
and standard deviation among symmetric parents. Columns (1) and (2) restrict attention to investments
in children 5 years old and younger; columns (3) and (4), to investments in children 6 years old and older.
δ̂ is the discount factor each parent attaches to their child’s future utility of consumption, calibrated from
their allocation decisions in the experiment (see Appendix E). We do not include other controls because
present-bias correlates with some household and individual characteristics. Standard errors clustered at
the village level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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G.2 Selective attrition tests
This Appendix tests for selective attrition between decision rounds within the baseline
wave, and across the baseline and follow-up waves. Tables G.7 and G.9 show that attrition
is not systematically affected by treatment assignment at the framing experiment or by
commitment price, neither at baseline or at the follow-up wave. Tables G.8 and G.10 show
that AGD preferences do not systematically correlate with attrition within each treatment
arm.
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Table G.7: Test of differential attrition
(1) (2) (3)















Number of children 0.00656
(0.00413)








Constant 0.975*** 0.967*** 0.949***
(0.00731) (0.00580) (0.0276)
N 1627 1627 1627
Mean 0.972 0.972 0.972
F-test (p-value) 0.773 0.289 0.075
Notes: This table displays the results of three OLS regressions. The outcome variable is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the respondent was observed in all three waves of baseline data collection and 0 otherwise.
Column (1) shows how attrition varies according to the type and price of commitment offered to the
respondent. The omitted category is having been assigned to the probabilistic commitment device for a
price of 0.5 packets of peanuts. Column (2) shows how attrition varies according to the framing of the
second visit. The omitted categoy is the control group. Column (3) shows the correlation between attrition
and baseline characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table G.8: Test of differential attrition, per treatment arm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Labeling Anchoring Commitment
0.5 1 1.5
AGD indicator 0.000701 -0.0166 0.00487 -0.00782 0.0218 -0.0172
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0198) (0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0154)
Observations 817 405 405 515 525 587
Notes: This table displays the results of OLS regressions. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent was observed in all three waves of baseline data collection and 0 otherwise. The
outcome variable is regressed on the same baseline variables as those reported in column (3) in Table G.7,
separately for each probabilistic commitment device (in columns (1) to (3)) and price (in columns (4) to
(6)). We only report the coefficient for the indicator of AGD preferences. Standard errors in parentheses.*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table G.9: Test of differential attrition in the follow-up
(1) (2) (3)















Number of children 0.00755
(0.00719)








Constant 0.903*** 0.901*** 0.890***
(0.0127) (0.0101) (0.0414)
N 1627 1627 1627
Mean 0.908 0.908 0.908
F-test (p-value) 0.479 0.553 0.207
Notes: This table displays the results of three OLS regressions. The outcome variable is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the respondent was observed in the baseline data collection and in the follow-up and 0
otherwise. Column (1) shows how attrition varies according to the type and price of commitment offered
to the respondent. The omitted category is having been assigned to the probabilistic commitment device
for a price of 0.5 packets of peanuts. Column (2) shows how attrition varies according to the framing of the
second visit. The omitted categoy is the control group. Column (3) shows the correlation between attrition
and baseline characteristics. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
85
Table G.10: Test of differential attrition in the follow-up, per treatment arm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control Labeling Anchoring Commitment
0.5 1 1.5
AGD indicator -0.0502* 0.0317 0.0107 -0.0553 0.0222 -0.0120
(0.0240) (0.0308) (0.0323) (0.0296) (0.0303) (0.0256)
Observations 817 405 405 515 525 587
Notes: This table displays the results of OLS regressions. The outcome variable is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the respondent was observed in the baseline data collection and in the follow-up and 0 otherwise.
The outcome variable is regressed on the same baseline variables as those reported in column (3) in Tables
G.7 and G.9, separately for each probabilistic commitment device (columns (1) to (3)) and price (columns
(4) to (6)). We only report the coefficient for the AGD indicator. Standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
G.3 Fungibility of peanuts and consumption outside the lab
Table G.11 regresses measures of children’s consumption outside of the experiment at
the beginning of round 2 (the number of hours since the child last ate and whether the
child is hungry) on parent’s allocation decisions on that date and two days before. The
correlation between children’s consumption outside of the experiment and parents’ round-1
allocations to children express parents’ plans to adjust children’s consumption outside of
the experiment; that between the former and parents’ round-2 allocations express whether
they follow through on those plans. The table shows that while parents systematically plan
to adjust their child’s consumption in response to the share of peanuts they are bound to
receive in the experiment, they do not follow through on those plans. Moreover, child’s
hunger is unrelated to consumption shares allocated in the experiment at either decision
round.
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Table G.11: Substitution between allocation decisions and consumption outside of the experiment
(beginning of round 2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of hours since the child last ate Child is hungry
skji 3.467** 1.272 0.0827 0.0304
(1.747) (1.671) (0.129) (0.126)
skji × 1{j = 2} -0.886 0.407 0.0213 0.0318
(2.066) (1.955) (0.167) (0.162)
1{j = 2} 0.550 -0.157 -0.0066 -0.0141
(1.023) (1.004) (0.0828) (0.0835)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
k 1 2 1 2
Mean 5.30 5.30 0.48 0.48
N 1,590 1,590 1,590 1,590
Respondents 795 795 795 795
Notes: This table reports the results from two sets of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions which
assess whether parents adjust the child’s outside consumption in anticipation of round 2. In colums (1-2)
the outcome variable is the number of hours since the child last ate by the start of round 2. In colums (3-4)
the outcome variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent reports that the child is hungry at
the beginning of round 2, 0 otherwise. In columns (1) and (3), the independent variables are the shares
of peanuts that the parents allocated to the child in their first round decision. In columns (2) and (4),
the independent variables are the shares of peanuts that the parents allocated to the child in their second
round decision. Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the
child, a measure of credit constraints, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not,
and the order in which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard
errors clustered at the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
87
G.4 Inter-temporal trade-offs and present-bias
The inter-temporal scenario in the experiment allows us to test the following hypotheses:
(1) whether subjects react rationally to interest rates (and, hence, understand the design);
(2) whether there were unexpected shocks to the parents’ (expected) marginal utility of
consumption between decision rounds; and (3) whether subjects are present-biased.
We formally test those hypotheses with the following regression:
sk30,ri = α+ γ1r + γ21{k = 2}+ γ3 (r × 1{k = 2}) + λXki + εki,
where sk30,ri is the share of peanuts allocated in the inter-temporal scenario by subject i
to be consumed at t = 30 when the choice is made at t = k under interest r. Hypothesis (1)
is equivalent to testing γ1 ≥ 0; hypothesis (2) amounts to whether parents react differently
to the interest rate in different time periods (γ3 = 0); and hypothesis 3) is equivalent to
testing γ2 ≤ 0.
Table G.12 presents the results, documenting that subjects respond rationally to in-
terest rates, that they do not react differently to interest rates across rounds (ruling out
that the reallocations we observe between both decision periods are driven by unexpected
shocks to the parents’ (expected) marginal utility of consumption), and that they are
present-biased on average.





1{k = 2} -0.0359**
(0.0165)




Mean at k = 1 0.769
N 4770
Respondents 795
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of the interest rate and the time of decision on the share
of peanuts that parents decide to receive in the later time period when making a decision in the allocation
task in the inter-temporal Scenario. The sample is restricted to the control sample. The unit of observation
is one consumption decision. The outcome variable is the share of consumption that respondents choose
to receive at t = 30 in a decision made at t = k, at interest rate r. Control variables include the gender
and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, an indicator
variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which the inter-temporal and main
scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Figure G.1 allows easily visualizing those three features: subjects respect the law of
demand, they react similarly to interest rates in both decision rounds, and they reallocate
substantially towards current consumption when given the opportunity to revise their
round-1 decision.
Figure G.1: Responses to interest rates and present-bias in the inter-temporal scenario
Notes: The figure plots the share of peanuts that respondents choose to receive in round 2, i.e. the earlier
time period, in the inter-temporal Scenario, for different interest rates. The left panel shows the choice
respondents made in round 1 and the right panel shows the choices they made in round 2. The red lines
plot the predicted relationship between the share of peanuts to be received in round 1 and the interest
rate, based on an OLS regression.
G.4.1 Joint distribution of biases
Table G.13 documents that there is no correlation between preference reversals across
the different experimental scenarios that parents decide on. Parents who reallocate away
from initial plans when it comes to their own future consumption between decision rounds
are typically not the ones who reallocate away from their children’s future consumption
between decision rounds. The table also rules out that the distribution of AGD preferences
systematically differs according to β̂.
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Table G.13: Distribution of parents’ time preferences
Panel A: Joint distribution of preference reversals across experimental scenarios
(1) (2)
Did not reallocate away from
own t = 30 consumption
Reallocated away from own
t = 30 consumption
Did not reallocate away from
child’s t = 30 consumption
consumption
48.94% 36.80%
Reallocated away from child’s
t = 30 consumption
7.51% 6.76%
Fisher exact test, p-stat : 0.415
Sample limited to the control group.
Panel B: Joint distribution of θ̂ and β̂
β̂ < 1 β̂ ≥ 1
θ̂ ≥ 1 29.79 % 40.05%
θ̂ < 1 13.77% 16.40 %
Fisher exact test, p-stat : 0.438
Full sample.
Notes: This table represents the joint distribution of the parents’ time preferences as captured by their
behavior in experimental scenarios A and B. Column (1) in Panel A refers to parents that decreased the
share of consumption they had allocated to be consumed at t = 30 in Scenario A and column (2) to parents
that did not make such adjustment. The rows refer to the parents’ behavior in Scenario B and distinguish
parents who decreased the share of t = 30 consumption allocated to their child and those who did not.
Panel B shows the joint distribution of θ̂ and β̂ as captured by the parents’ behavior in experimental
scenarios A and B.
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G.4.2 Asymmetric quasi-hyperbolic discounting
We extend the consumption model in Section 2.1 to allow for asymmetric quasi-hyperbolic
discounting of parents’ and children’s future utility of consumption, and then test empiri-
cally for whether that is systematically the case within our sample. Appendix E presents
the empirical distributions of βa and βc (the quasi-hyperbolic discount factors that the
parent applies to her future consumption and that of her child, respectively) calibrated for
each study participant based on their allocation decisions in the experiment.
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As such, the model predicts that when parents are more present-biased with respect
to their own future utility of consumption (βc > βa), the gap between sk2 and sk3 increases
when the earlier allocation is in the present (at k = 2) relative to when both allocations
are set in the future (at k = 1).
Along those lines, we use our experimental data to estimate whether ∆ski , the difference
between sk2 and sk30, changes between decision rounds k = 0 and k = 2. We are particularly
interested in whether that is the case among AGD parents. We estimate the following
regression:
∆ski = α+ γ11{k = 2}+ γ21{θ̂i < 1}+ γ3
(
1{k = 2} × 1{θ̂i < 1}
)
+ λXi + εki,
(G.3)
where ∆ski = s
k
30,i − sk2,i is the difference in the share of peanuts parent i allocates to be
consumed by the child at t = 30 and t = 2 when making the decision at t = k. We are
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interested in testing γ3 ≥ 0.
Table G.14 presents the results. The gap between consumption shares set to children
at different planning horizons decreases among AGD parents between decision rounds,
suggesting that, if anything, they are more present-biased about their children’s future
consumption than about their own (βc < βa).
Table G.14: Testing for asymmetric quasi-hyperbolic discounting
(1)
∆sk
1{k = 2} 0.0487***
(0.00651)
1{θ̂i < 1} 0.259***
(0.00597)






Notes: This table presents the result of an OLS regression which estimates whether AGD parents assign a
different quasi-hyperbolic factor to their own consumption and that of their children. The outcome variable
is ∆sk = sk30 − sk2 the difference in the child’s shares of consumption allocated to be consumed at t = 30
and t = 2 at decision round t = k. The sample is restricted to the control sample. Control variables include
the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, an
indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in which the inter-temporal
and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
G.5 Sophistication
This Appendix compiles our findings for subjects’ sophistication about preference reversals.
We define as sophisticated present-biased participants who predicted at round 1 that they
would (or that the majority of participants would) reallocate away from their round-3
consumption when deciding at round 2 relative to their round-1 plans, and parent-biased
participants who predicted at round 1 that they would (or that the majority of participants
would) reallocate away children’s round-3 consumption when deciding at round 2 relative
to their round-1 plans.
Figure G.2 displays the joint distribution of beliefs about others and about one’s own
behavior, when it comes to whether allocations to one’s future self (Panel a) or one’s chil-
dren (Panel b) would change in the next round relative to present plans. Figure G.15 com-
pares the prevalence of sophistication among parents who reverse plans between decision
rounds in each experimental scenario, using different sets of beliefs to capture sophistica-
tion. Figure G.16 shows the joint distribution of sophistication across biases, extending the
92
definition of sophistication to include all subjects (biased or not) who acted consistently
with their beliefs within each scenario.
Figure G.2: Joint distribution of beliefs about others and about oneself
(a) Inter-temporal Scenario (b) Within-household decision (main Scenario)
Notes: Those two figures plot how (incentivized) beliefs about others’ future behavior correlate with
(unincentivized) beliefs about one’s own behavior, in the inter-temporal Scenario (Figure G.2a) and B
(Figure G.2b). Each figure plots the distribution of beliefs about one’s own behavior in round 2 depending
on what the respondent guessed how the majority of other households would act in round 2. We exclude
those who responded that they didn’t know how the majority of others would behave in round 2.
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Table G.15: Sophistication across present-bias and parent-bias
(1) (2) (3)
Share of sophisticated respondents
Panel A: Beliefs about others
Reallocation Reallocation p-value
towards the present towards the parent (1)-(2)
0.365 0.333 0.3569
(0.482) (0.473)
Panel B: Beliefs about self
Reallocation Reallocation p-value
towards the present towards the parent (1)-(2)
0.239 0.191 0.0882 *
(0.427) (0.395)
N 348 141
Notes: This table reports the share of respondents who accurately predicted the direction of their t = 2
reallocation, or absence thereof, at t = 0. The sample is restricted to respondents in the Control group
who reallocated away from the future in column (1) or who reallocated away from their child in column
(2). Column (1) reports the fraction of sophisticated agents among respondents who reallocated away
from the future in the inter-temporal Scenario. Column (2) reports the fraction of sophisticated agents
among respondents who reallocated away from their child in the main Scenario. Column (3) reports the
p-value of a two-sided t-test of equality of means. In panel A, sophistication is measured with respect to
the respondent’s prediction about the behavior of “most other” participants. The elicitation of those beliefs
was incentivized. In panel B, sophistication is measured with respect to the respondent’s prediction about
the behavior of her future self. The elicitation of those beliefs was unincentivized.
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Table G.16: Joint distribution of sophistication
Panel A: Beliefs about others
Inter-temporal
Naive Sophisticated
Within Naive 54.75% 15.00%
Household Sophisticated 22.25% 8.00%
Panel B: Beliefs about self
Inter-temporal
Naive Sophisticated
Within Naive 40.95% 24.97%
Household Sophisticated 19.48% 14.61%
Notes: This table reports the share of respondents who accurately predicted the direction of their
t = 2 reallocation, or absence thereof, at t = 0, for both the within-household decision of the main
Scenario and the decision of the inter-temporal Scenario. Panel A reports the fraction of respondents
whose behavior at t = 2 was in line with the behavior they predicted most other respondents would
adopt. The elicitation of those beliefs was incentivized. Panel B reports the fraction of respondents
whose behavior at t = 2 was in line with the behavior they predicted they would adopt. The elicitation
of those beliefs was unincentivized.
G.6 Demand for commitment in the lab
We test whether AGD parents demand commitment to past plans to a greater extent than
symmetric parents trough the following regression:
Yi = α+ γ01{θ̂i < 1}+ γ1Pricei + γ2
(
Pricei × 1{θ̂i < 1}
)
+ λXi + εi, (G.4)
where Yi equals 1 if the parent i takes up commitment at Pricei (randomly assigned), and
0 otherwise. We are interested in testing γ0 ≥ 0 and γ2 ≥ 0.
Table G.17 shows that while AGD parents are more likely than symmetric parents to
demand commitment at low prices, their demand falls more steeply with prices than that
of other parents. All in all, commitment in the lab is very high, and there is no systematic
relationship between AGD preferences and demand for commitment in the experiment. As
a benchmark, we also offered participants the possibility of committing to their round-1
decisions in their inter-temporal scenario. Table G.17 also shows very high commitment on
average, but no systematic relationship between present-bias and demand for commitment.
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Table G.17: Demand for commitment in the lab
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Takes up the probabilistic commitment device
Main Scenario Inter-temporal Scenario
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.103** 0.0148
(0.0430) (0.0161)
1{θ̂ < 1} × Price -0.0867**
(0.0391)
1{β̂ < 1} 0.0334 0.0190
(0.0404) (0.0150)




Price × Belief Parent-Bias 0.0396
(0.0372)
Price -0.0194 -0.0616*** -0.0358
(0.0215) (0.0228) (0.0239)
Mean for 1{θ̂ < 1} 91.1 % 91.1%
Mean for 1{β̂ < 1} 91.3% 91.3%
Price fixed effects No Yes No No Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1622 1622 1622 1591 1591
Notes: This table reports the estimated impact of AGD (col. (1-2)), beliefs over reversals (col. (3)) and
present-bias (col. (4-5)) on the demand for the probabilistic commitment device in the main Scenario and
the inter-temporal Scenario respectively. The outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent
takes up the probabilistic commitment device, zero otherwise. Respondents choose whether to take up the
commitment device after making allocation decisions during the first visit. Taking up the commitment
device reduces the probability that round 2 decision will be implemented. The commitment device comes
at a random price (0.5, 1 or 1.5 packages of peanuts deducted from the parents’ allocation at t = 3.).
Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure
of credit constraints, an indicator variable of whether the household is Muslim or not, and the order in
which the inter-temporal and main scenarios were presented to the respondent. The sample is restricted
to parents having been offered the probabilistic commitment device. Belief Parent-Bias is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if respondents predict that the majority of respondents would allocate more peanuts
to themselves in the second round, in the incentivized task, and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at
the household level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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G.7 Commitment outside the lab
This Appendix documents participants’ willingness to commit lottery proceedings to a
savings account, varying whether that account was earmarked to their child or not. Ta-
ble G.18 presents the results. While we find that AGD parents are significantly more likely
to express interest in commitment in that case, they are no more willing to pay for it
than symmetric parents. What is more, their demand actually seems to be more closely
connected to a savings account than to commitment against parent-bias, as they are ac-
tually much less willing to pay for an account earmarked to their children relative to one
under their own name (the effect size is large, but imprecisely estimated as less that 12%
of respondents express interest in opening a bank account under their child’s name).
Table G.18: AGD preferences and demand for a savings account (earmarked to their child or not)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Interest in committing lottery prize to child’s savings account WTP Interest in child’s savings account (rather than own account) WTP
1{θ̂ < 1} 0.027* -55.71 0.016 -133.95
(0.015) (53.11) (0.018) (174.73)
AGD parents’ mean 0.935 3607.88 0.138 536.67
Symmetric parents’ mean 0.913 3638.37 0.118 639.87
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1989 1826 1887 237
Notes: This table looks at the impact of AGD on parents’ willingness to pay for a savings account. In
column (1), the outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the parent chooses to open a bank account
in its child’s name instead of receiveing 2,000 kwachas in cash if they earned it in the lottery, even when
the savings account’s option is free. In column (2), the outcome variable is the willingness to pay for this
savings account, restricting the sample to parents for which there exists a non-negative price at which
they would take up the savings account. In column (3), the outcome variable is a dummy equal to 1 if
the parent chooses to open a savings account in the name of its child rather than its own. In column (4),
the outcome variable is the willingness to pay for this savings account, among parents for which there
exists a non-negative price at which they would take up the savings account in their child’s name. Control
variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender and age of the child, a measure of credit
constraints, the number of children, the religion of the household, the level of education of the respondent.
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
G.8 Child participation
This Appendix documents the effects of having one’s child be present at their parent’s
round-2 decision. To study whether child participation mitigates parent-bias, we ran-
domly assign it to a different sample of parents at the baseline experiment, separate from
the sample used throughout the paper – but balanced with respect to all household and
individual characteristics that we observe at baseline. Parents for whom we impose child
participation at round 2 are not informed until their round-1 allocation decisions have been
made.
We are also interested in whether parents are willing to pay to let their children partic-
ipate in their round-2 decision. For yet a different sample, also separate from the one used
throughout the paper, we offer, at the end of round 1, the opportunity to invite their child
to be present during their round-2 decision. We randomize the commitment price in that
case (0, 0.5 or 1 package of peanuts, deducted from the participant’s round-3 consumption).
Just as in the case of the probabilistic commitment device, we also do not adjust shares by
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the commitment price, as parents were unaware of (potentially) costly commitment when
setting their round-1 allocation decisions.
Table G.19 presents the results, using as the control group those in our main sample
assigned to the control group of the framing experiment. We find that imposing child
participation significantly increases children’s t = 30 consumption share among symmetric
parents, but magnifies parent-bias among AGD parents – consistent with the theoretical
possibility derived in Appendix D.2. We also find that AGD parents are more likely to
demand child participation, but that their demand oddly increases with prices.
Table G.19: Child participation
(1) (2) (3)
∆s30 Choose to involve the child in the decision
Child Participation 0.0268**
(Imposed) (0.0111)
1{θ̂ < 1} -0.117*** 0.00359 0.109*
(0.0115) (0.0955) (0.0564)
Child Participation (Imposed) -0.0611***
× 1{θ̂ < 1} (0.0213)
Price child participation -0.0127
(0.0540)
Price child participation 0.134
× 1{θ̂ < 1} (0.0983)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Price fixed effects No No Yes
Mean 0.0178 0.586 0.586
N 1192 377 377
Notes: Column (1) looks at the impact of imposing that the child should participate in the second round
decision on the change in the child’s t = 30 share of consumption. The sample is restricted to respondents
in the Control group and the Child Participation (Imposed) treatment arm. In columns (2) and (3), the
outcome variable is a dummy equal to one if the parents choose to involve their child in the round 2
decision. The sample is restricted to respondents who were offered the possibility to involve their child in
that second round decision. Control variables include the gender and age of the respondent, the gender
and age of the child, a measure of credit constraints, the number of children, the religion of the household,
the level of education of the respondent. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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